Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-95-093 *15 May 1995*

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Group 'Deeply Concerned' by Bosnian, Croat Tension

LD1205140195 Berlin DDP/ADN in German 1310 GMT 12 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Bonn (DDP/ADN)—The international Contact Group on former Yugoslavia, comprising the United States, Russia, France, Britain, and Germany, is "deeply concerned" about the "dangerous increase" in tension in Bosnia and Croatia. According to the German Foreign Ministry, the members of the group said after a meeting in Frankfurt today that the United Nations has the group's full backing for its peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia. UN authority must be restored in areas of confrontation in Croatia, the group says.

The Contact Group reiterates the "need for early mutual recognition between the states of former Yugoslavia." It says the group's peace plan must be accepted by the Bosnian Serbs. The cease-fire in Bosnia has to be renewed, it says.

Statement on Talks in Frankfurt

LD1205141895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1321 GMT 12 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bonn, May 12 (TANJUG)—The five-power 'Contact Group' for Bosnia in its meeting in Frankfurt on Friday called for a change in the U.N. mandate and fully supported U.N. peace efforts.

An official statement released after the meeting of the political directors of Russian, U.S., British, French and German Foreign Ministries said the Contact Group was deeply concerned over dangerously mounting tension in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially around Sarajevo.

The Contact group also voiced concern over the situation in Croatia and urged that the U.N. supervision be restored in area of conflict.

The Contact Group members again called for a mutual recognition of states created in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Bosnian Serb acceptance of the Contact Group plan and renewal of the Bosnia-wide ceasefire.

The statement said the Contact Group would continue to exert intensive efforts within the peace process hoping these efforts should make headway in the near future.

The statement concealed rather than disclosed what the ranking five-state diplomats agreed upon.

German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, in his interview with a German TV morning show early on Friday, cautiously hinted that there were some novelties concerning parties interested in the denouement of the Balkan crisis, at that point referring to Belgrade.

The fact that no such thing was mentioned in the official statement issued after the Contact Group meeting could imply either that the group failed to reach an agreement on this altered approach or that it was first going to inform relevant parties about any changes in stands.

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Attack on Serbian-Montenegrin Association Leader

LD1305122195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1132 GMT 13 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 13 May (TANJUG)—A terrorist attack was carried out on 10 May in Shkoder on Burhan Culic, president of the Moraca-Rozafa Serbian-Montenegrin minority association in Albania, and Vice Presidents Milan Brajovic and Mihajlo Strikic.

TANJUG has learned that the attack was carried out at 2120 when explosive devices, planted outside the front doors to their apartments, were simiultaniously detonated. No one was injured in the explosion, but the apartments were badly damaged. At the time of the attack only members of their families were in the apartments. The doors and windows on the adjoining apartments were also demolished.

Immediately after the attack a police patrol arrived at the scene, but the chase has not yet yielded any results. The Culic and Brajovic families were visited by Miroljub Zaric, the Yugoslav charge d'affaires in Tirana, after the attack.

Border Police To Observe FRY Embargo

AU1505083095 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 13 May 95

[Report by Sokol Terihati from Shkoder]

[FBIS Translated Text] The establishment of a full embargo against Serbia and Montenegro by the United Nations has obliged the new Albanian state as a neighboring country to observe this as rigorously as possible. However, the great economic problems that we inherited have very often obliged various citizens, particularly residents in Malesi e Madhe and Shkoder and those who live near the Shkoder Lake, to try to ensure illegal incomes by means of smuggling various commodities, particularly fuel. This was instigated by the difference in price on each side of the border. Smuggling, which in most cases is carried out in nonurban areas and through waters in the Shkoder and Bune lakes, has been under the constant attention of the work carried out by state authorities, particularly of the police forces.

Despite continuous action, this phenomenon has continued for the very fact that in Shkoder, the second city in the country, and its neighboring areas, investment and the opening of new positions have been lower than the other great centers inside the country and this has been due to the embargo.

To precisely increase the extent to which international obligations have been fulfilled, the Albanian Government has currently defined new measures to increase efficiency and end the smuggling. In implementation of these measures, in the early morning hours today, despite the bad weather, the police units undertook a large operation in the area bordering Montenegro and particularly around the shores of the Shkoder lake.

Regarding this operation, Ferit Hajdari, chief of the border police of Malesi e Madhe, told the television:

[Begin recording] We undertook this operation to see that the Council of Ministers' decision on the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro is implemented. [end recording]

[Terihati] There are dozens of motorboats, fuel barrels, or tank-trucks that stay hidden here to carry out fuel smuggling and its transportation. These were the target of the police operation. Mr. Hyzvi [not further identified], what were the results of this operation:

[Begin recording] The results of the operation undertaken by the police were that three tankers were blocked on the lake shores you see here in this area, as well as 50 metric tons of flour loaded on these two trucks. The police have also blocked two vehicles that transport fuel, loaded with kerosene, which, as you see through the camera, have been blocked by the police forces. We will accompany the vehicles to the state reserves. This operation is in the wake of implementing the government's decision on the embargo imposed on Serbia and Montenegro.

[Terihati] How has the situation been on other days?

[Hajdari] No greater development has been noted on other days. We are waiting for greater help in terms of equipment, to stop it completely. [end recording]

[Terihati] Here, where we are filming, we are just 400 meters away from the land strip of Montenegro, where the persons and equipment were seized. After arriving here, the tank-trucks supply their water tankers through these tubes, and carry it across the border, work that is especially carried out in the late night hours, which makes the work even more difficult.

There are also many cases that testify to the fact that this activity is carried out during the day. Look at these motorboats that continue, even as we film, to enter and leave Montenegro. From the talks with the police cadres, we learned that besides their commitment, they expressed concern over the lack of sailing equipment to match up to the smugglers' swift technique. Placing better equipment at their disposal would strengthen the preservation of the embargo in this area.

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We manage to identify them, but are unable to catch them, as in the present case, they told us. Nevertheless, the government's last decision has enabled the blocking of hundreds of transportation means and the closing of several fuel stations along the border strip. Confiscations have also been carried out and dozens of persons involved in this trafficking have been detained, among them Montenegrin equipment and nationals. Nevertheless, a lot of work remains to be done by all relevant authorities if the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro is to be rigorously observed.

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SDS Delegation Meets Bundestag Deputy Hornhues

AU1205132295 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 10 May pp 1, 5

[FBIS Translated Text] Bonn (DEMOKRATSIYA)—Bulgaria will be accepted into the EU and NATO if it preserves and develops the democratic changes that the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] government began. This was the viewpoint that the SDS delegation visiting Bonn heard from their German hosts.

National Assembly Deputies Vasil Gotsev, who is also SDS deputy chairman, Asen Agov, Krum Slavov, Valentin Vasilev, and Grigor Malev were received yesterday by Karl-Heinz Hornhues, chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Policy Commission. The German parliamentarian declared that the ruling coalition of the CDU/CSU/FDP [Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union, and Free Democratic Party] advocates expanding the EU and NATO through the addition of Central European countries, including Bulgaria.

Asen Agov, deputy chairman of the National Assembly Foreign Policy Commission, emphasized that the SDS stance is that Bulgaria should express its clear desire to become a full member of NATO. He announced that the SDS parliamentary group has submitted a draft resolution of this kind to the National Assembly.

"We hope that the government will support it. If not, the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] cabinet will have to explain to Bulgarians why it rejects this opportunity to guarantee their security," Agov said.

The Bulgarian deputies and Mr. Hornhues established that the views of Germany and the SDS on the issue of NATO expansion coincide. Agov said that he will ask the Foreign Policy Commission to invite Mr. Hornhues to visit Bulgaria as its guest. The SDS delegation's visit to Bonn concluded with a three-hour meeting with CDU Secretary General Petur Hintze and CDU Organizational Secretary Hans-Joachim Reck. The meeting was also attended by Johann-Adolf Cohausz [name as transliterated], director of the CDU Office for International Affairs, with whom the SDS deputies had already held a three-hour meeting the previous evening.

The discussion focussed on the new SDS structures, which the CDU leadership assessed in very positive terms. There was also a detailed discussion of cooperation between the SDS and CDU in connection with the forthcoming local elections in Bulgaria.

"Our traditional friendship with the CDU is now taking the form of concrete practical cooperation," said Valentin Vasilev, chairman of the SDS central election club. Following the talks in Konrad Adenhauer House in Bonn, Vasil Gotsev, the delegation's leader, said: "We are very encouraged by our meetings with our close friends from the CDU. They highly praise and approve the changes in the SDS structures and the SDS's policies in opposition and for the forthcoming local elections. I believe that Ivan Kostov's visit to Bonn in the near future will intensify this process."

Last night the SDS deputies arrived in Brussels, where they will have two days of talks at the European Commission, European Parliament, and NATO Headquarters.

National Assembly Adopts Defense Draft Bill

AU1205173595 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 12 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 12 May the National Assembly adopted at first reading the Defense and Armed Forces Draft Bill. The bill will be finally adopted by the end of parliament's summer session, in order to stabilize the army and continue the reforms in the defense and national security.

The National Assembly members made many proposals concerning the draft bill. They referred to the length of the military service, the role of the General Staff, the prerogatives of the separate power institutions in issues of national security, and the future of the Construction Troops.

Opposition Forces Discuss Cooperation in Elections

AU1205174695 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 12 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The anticipated summit meeting of the leaders of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] and the People's Union, the two largest opposition forces, took place on 12 May at the National Assembly.

The meeting between SDS leader Ivan Kostov and the two leaders of the People's Union—Anastasiya Mozer, Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, and Stefan Savov, Democratic Party—lasted almost two hours. They discussed and signed a document on the basic principles of cooperation between the SDS and the People's Union in the municipal elections.

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Joint candidates will be nominated. The municipal structures of the two political formations will be granted a broad autonomy in this activity, and the candidates will have first to commit themselves to a program concerning the specific constituency in which they will be nominated, and to guarantees concerning the continuation of the reforms. An expert group will compose the programs.

Bilateral meetings on this matter with representatives of the Rights and Freedoms Movement will be held in the future.

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Havel Urges Political Talks To End Chechnya War

LD1405154795 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1215 GMT 14 May 95

[Interview with President Vaclav Havel by Robert Tamchyna; "Conversations at Lany"; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Tamchyna] [Passage omitted] Mr. President, last week you took part in the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II both in London and Moscow. Could you compare the atmosphere of these events?

[Havel] [Passage omitted] I think that the overall course and organization of the Moscow celebrations deserves some critical remarks.

[Tamchyna] Have you, for instance, discussed this with some leading human rights activists whom you met in Moscow?

[Havel] The issue of Chechnya was, of course, in the air during all celebrations and meetings in Moscow. All of the statesmen, not only I, who traveled there came there unequivocally in order to pay respect to those who perished in the struggle, those who are not any longer among us, and to thank those who fought and liberated Europe and are still around.

None of us went there to approve in any way what is happening in Chechnya. Personally, unlike other statesmen, I also went to meet Mr. Kovalev, who is a great expert on the situation in Chechnya, has spent long weeks there, and is a well-known opponent of the military operation in Chechnya. I also met Mrs. Bogoraz, another well-known human rights activist. I met them for about three-quarters of an hour, and they gave me specific examples of what is happening in Chechnya; and I do not have the slightest reason not to believe them.

The information I was given is shattering. The war there really has elements of a genocide. It is a war of attrition against a civilian population; special-purpose Interior Ministry commandos are being used not only against partisan units—whom they are unable to ever defeat, anyway—but also against civilians who are supporting partisan units.

My view is that there is only one solution to this: to halt all of these operations immediately, without paying attention to any damage to the prestige of the state, and to embark on political talks. The issue of with whom to hold these talks, what to discuss, and the duration of these talks is another question—and one that is not of any fundamental importance at present. The fundamental issue is to immediately halt the massacre. [passage omitted]

Tesla Allegedly Selling Stealth-Detecting Systems

AU1205152395 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 11 May 95 p 16

[Article by Jan Gazdik: "NATO Is Allegedly Interested in Tamara"]

[FBIS Translated Text] HTT Tesla Pardubice, the producer of the unique passive radar Tamara, is currently concluding a contract on the sale abroad of three systems. According to a source that wishes to remain anonymous, the customers are NATO members.

HTT Vice President Ludek Stodulka confirmed that three contracts ($15-20 million each) are about to be signed. He denied, however, the information that this involves Alliance countries. "They are customers to whom the Czech authorities will be able to issue the export licenses without any problem," he added. According to Stodulka, the contract should pay the 155 million korunas that the Tesla Pardubice owners still owe the National Property Fund for its purchase. It would allegedly also cover most of the debt burden (1.8 billion), with which they assumed ownership of the firm. Tesla would thus definitely avert the petition for bankruptcy that has threatened the company because of its debts. It got into a bind because, among other things, it has not sold a single Tamara since 1989 although, according its chief, Oldrich Barak, it has negotiated several dozen contracts. According to Industry Ministry spokesman Kamil Cermak, however, the designated markets mostly proved risky. A shipment to India has also been temporarily halted as Omnipol charged an exaggerated 50-percent provision—i.e., $7.5 million.

Vice President Stodulka has no comment on the information from reliable sources, according to which the U.S. manufacturers of the F-117 Stealth invisible fighter jet or the Northrop B-2 strategic bomber have invested great efforts to wreck the Tamara project. "We have not observed anything like that," Stodulka said. Nevertheless, he admitted that such endeavors would be quite logical. Namely, contrary to traditional radar systems, Tamara detects these aircraft without any difficulty, the development of which cost the United States hundreds of millions of dollars.

A high-ranking state official confirmed that the United States obtained one Tamara and also its predecessor, Ramona, through the Sultanate of Oman as long as three years ago. "They, most likely, are at a loss about it still today," he said. Stodulka claims that Tamara has a complex specific software that cannot be

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understood without special training. This allegedly is one of the reasons why the U.S. Army showed interest in cooperating with the Czech Army, which is equipped with Tamara. The states of the former USSR also own 40 Tamaras and Ramonas.

HZDS Coalition Beset by Disagreement

95CH0222A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 10 Apr 95 p 14

[Article by Berthold Kohler: "The Bratislava Spring"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava, Apr—Spring is not a good season of the year for Vladimir Meciar. In April 1991, he was deposed for the first time from the office of Slovak prime minister. In March 1994, he was recalled for the second time as the head of government, after lacking a majority in parliament for several months. The so-called March crisis, which Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) has attempted to recast as a legend of the "stab in the back," exerted a significant influence upon Meciar's third takeover of the government, following the early elections in the fall of 1994. Traumatized by having lost power twice, Meciar completely excluded the political opposition from the democratic power game. He created an absolute majority for himself through two small radical parties—the nationalistic Slovak National Party (SNS) and the ultraleftist Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS). Meciar hesitated a long time before joining with the two unreliable customers that outdo his own party in terms of populism. The instinctive politician had every reason to hesitate because Meciar's parliamentary majority is being threatened this spring from both sides of the aisle.

During the first 100 days of the new government, it looked as though the obstinate coalition partners of the HZDS were going to immobilize the actual fulcrum and pivotal point of all power struggles in Slovakia through the assignment of important offices and, principally, through participation in the billions of korunas involved in the privatization process. The HZDS satellites were also permitted to engage in a little propaganda against the Western orientation of Slovakia, as proclaimed by Meciar, as long as they did not gain the attention of foreign countries by doing this in an overly negative manner. However, the SNS is in the assault mode when it comes to opposing the fundamental principles accord with Hungary, which Meciar needed in order to prove Slovakia's "Euro-capabilities" to the West. The party is afraid that the 560,000 ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia could read a right to autonomy—which is the most effective vision of fear used by the Slovak nationalists—into the agreement. SNS chief Slota says that this is totally unacceptable. Thus far, the agreement is "only a piece of paper that someone has signed." He, Slota, is certain that, "given the present coalition, the agreement will not be ratified." Meciar has commented that it is likely that it would still be necessary to "negotiate" something with the coalition partners. But there are sufficient other materials to be considered. Finally, the SNS has proposed that the criminal laws to protect the Republic be tightened and would call for up to five years in jail as punishment for spreading "false reports" about Slovakia, both domestically and abroad.

At the moment, however, it is more likely that the HZDS would have to deal with the "workers association" because the bolshevist protest party, which was established only last year, is already showing signs of disintegrating. On the occasion of the most recent ZRS party congress, four of the 13 ZRS delegates, including Deputy Party Chairman Kocnar, left the hall in protest against party policies and announced the establishment of their own parliamentary faction. Although even they want to continue supporting the Meciar government, the schism, which was actually a "booting out," sheds some light upon the condition of the party. ZRS Chairman Luptak accuses Kocnar of wanting to enrich himself on the basis of his official positions. The deputy chairman immediately lost his party office position, as well as his position as chairman of the Mandate and Immunity Committee in parliament. In the dispute over the mandate of the opposition Democratic Union (DU), which Meciar would love to remove from parliament, Kocnar had adopted a comparatively reconciliatory position—something that, in the final analysis, was not good for his career. Meciar stated at a public event that there had been "extraordinarily high pressure from abroad to defend the election fraud" (of the DU), but, he said, the matter would be decided by the sovereign Slovaks.

The departure of the four ZRS delegates, which reduced the majority in the coalition to 79 of the 150 parliamentary seats, is reminiscent of the second Meciar deposal, which also began with the splitting off of "disloyal" delegates. In the Slovak press, speculations about a Meciar minority government, which a part of the opposition could tolerate, began to be heard. But the prime minister did not engage in a fearful count of his minions; instead, he went over to the offensive himself, as is usual. By again adopting the secret service law, which President Kovac had returned to parliament, the head of government proved that he knows how to consolidate his power in a different way.

According to the amended law, which was passed by parliament, the chief of the secret Slovak Information Service (SIS) is no longer to be appointed and recalled by the president (as is called for by the Constitution) but, rather, by the government. Because the responsi-

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ble parliamentary committee is staffed exclusively by coalition delegates, Meciar's alliance controls the SIS completely. (SIS chief Mitro, who was dismissed by the government, claims that the HZDS has built up a type of private informer service anyway.) The proposed new chief of the official secret service is supposed to be Meciar's intimate friend Lexa, whose nomination has been twice rejected by Kovac with the justification that the candidate is allegedly "morally unreliable." Lexa, who currently still presides over the Secret Service Committee in parliament, has, since then, been after the political life of the president just as irreconcilably as has Meciar himself.

The fact that the HZDS chief has no intention of giving up his vendetta against Kovac, whom he holds responsible for his second deposal, was proved in the debate surrounding the secret service law. Before the plenum, Meciar accused his political opponents, including President Kovac, of allegedly having the HZDS, members of the government, and the speaker of parliament spied upon. This allegedly happened during Meciar's second time in office. Just recently, an SIS collaborator was dismissed because he allegedly refused to conduct surveillance on the prime minister. On the radio, Meciar said that he was the most spied-upon politician in Europe. However, the prime minister did not present any evidence.

Opposition politicians therefore consider the "well-staged" accusations to be more of a tactical maneuver, intended to divert attention away from the difficulties in the coalition, and even more from the most recent turnaround maneuvers involving privatization policy. The second round of coupon privatization, which was halted by Meciar immediately after he took office, will not involve enterprises valued at 70 billion korunas [Sk], as envisaged by the predecessor government, but only those valued at Sk40 billion. A value of the shares distributed to the population would thus be almost cut in half. The government wants to sell the major portion of the industries through direct sales or privatize them through employee participation and management models. From the virtually final hours in office of the second Meciar government, it has become known that the HZDS has no scruples when it comes to utilizing privatization to stabilize its own influence and to finance the next election struggle. The fact that it is precisely the current rocky coalition that will have a longer life than did Meciar's previous alliance is believed by the fewest people anyway, even though, as yet, no one is seriously speaking of early elections. But one has to figure on everything, prophesied the HZDS mouthpiece SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA following the defection of the four ZRS delegates. In Slovakia, it is said that "everything is truly possible." On the other hand, this does not apply to springtime.

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Meciar on Kovac, Hungarian Treaty

LD1205210495 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 12 May 95

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by correspondent Magda Pospisilova; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Pospisilova] Mr. Prime Minister, once again you called on President Michal Kovac to resign. You said that within 30 days a new president would be elected. As the fragmentation of our political scene makes an agreement of parliamentary parties on one candidate very improbable, how can you be so sure?

[Meciar]] In the 1993-94 period there was a conflict between constitutional bodies, and we are well aware that this resulted in a political crisis and early elections; and that in substance the concepts presented then by the president were politically refuted by our citizens. We can see that this conflict, in a different form, is developing once again, assuming the form of a conflict between the parliament and the president.

The president naturally defends himself by referring to a paragraph of the Constitution, pointing out that so far those 90 votes required for his dismissal have not been cast. This is true. On the other hand, besides legal norms, every society has also other norms—that is moral, political, and other norms. This time efforts are devoted to avoiding a conflict between constitutional bodies, avoiding a clash between the parliament and the president which would subsequently spread to other spheres. We could already see other parties in action, one calling for civic disobedience, the other for resistance against the government, etc. The ruling party naturally does not openly react to this.

However, I think that in the situation when the president is unable to prevent a conflict, in fact, did not act in a way to avoid provoking it, it is better if he resigns. Naturally, this decision also depends on him.

As regards a consensus on a candidate to be reached by the parliament, I do not think parliament will fail to do so. For instance, when we presented a very controversial bill on the conflict of interests, we gathered 92 votes in its favor.

The Slovak Parliament often gives an impression of being irrational, but in decisive moments is capable of finding a way out. Therefore, I expect that in order to bring about this situation and avoid a political struggle, a candidate—somebody—can be found who will be adopted by the political parties.

As regards future developments, there is no doubt that any political clashes or any new round of a struggle in support of or against Michal Kovac would not benefit Slovakia. Everybody is observing certain rules of behavior; when a vote of no confidence was passed in me I did not look for legal loopholes, but ran in the elections instead. This is linked to the issue of one's responsibility. Whether I put myself above what is common benefit and above the functioning of the system.

[Pospisilova] The bishops of Slovakia have unequivocally expressed their full support for and trust in the president of the republic. Given your very good relations with the Catholic Church, a number of people are waiting for your reaction to the step they have taken.

[Meciar] We held and continue to hold the church and its mission in high respect. We will support and develop its mission, though I unwillingly feel an urge to ask two questions. The first question is: As the bishops have declared unequivocally their attitude toward the president, what then is their attitude toward the parliament and the government, which are on the other side? Sometimes it is not possible to support all. Should we, on the basis of this polarization, distinguish among believers according to their political affiliation?

The other issue is that as they say that Mr. Michal Kovac performs the duties of his post in harmony with the Constitution and the laws of this state, it would be a reasonable thing for the father bishops to make public their own investigation findings, if they are different from those objectively found by the parliament and other institutions. If there are no such findings then they have merely the right to their view as citizens, the right I respect in all people.

I regret that because of this political attitude to a certain person we are in dispute about other constitutional bodies. Is it not true that the parliament, the parliament of the republic, is more important than the president? Is it? I asked this question during my talks with Archbishop Sokol today. And he should answer this question to his believers, not to me, as I am the executive power and, moreover, the representative of the government, which is very favorable to the church.

[Pospisilova] The Czech Government proposed abolishing the payments agreement with the Slovak Republic on 1 September 1995. It is allegedly motivated to take this step by two facts—the efforts to make the Czech crown convertible and the entry to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Do you think, Mr. Prime Minister, that these are the real reasons behind this step?

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[Meciar] These two reasons are stated in the [Czech Government's] letter. However, if there was good will, the situation could be resolved by an amendment to the payments agreement. If the volume [of payment deficit] is less than two percent, this variant is possible while maintaining a certain form of payment. This payment agreement does not necessarily have to be scrapped. In my view, the situation on the Czech side results not only from these two facts but also from certain nervousness with regard to the development of the balance of payments, as this is positive for Slovakia. The fate of the payments has—more or less—been decided upon in a unilateral way. A mere formal visible gesture was made when I was told: Well, Meciar, we have decided and you should come and sign it.

Well, it is not possible to talk to me in this way. We are no longer an appendix of the Czech Republic. We are a sovereign state. Therefore, we request that the Czech officials show the same respect for officials of my state as the respect we show for Czech officials. At the same time they can think of me whatever they wish. However, I am a government representative and as such I have to defend my government in international relations as well. [passage omitted Czech Government letter being studied]

[Pospisilova] Relatively soon after your previous talks with Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. deputy secretary of foreign affairs for Europe and Canada, the two of you held talks again on Wednesday. The talks lasted for more than two hours. In the world of diplomacy, such a long discussion is relatively rare. Was it due to the number of topics discussed or was it at the request of the U.S. partner?

[Meciar] It was me who asked for this talk. There are some problems related to the developments in Europe, to integration processes, as well as stances taken on these issues by various international bodies that called for discussion. On 6 May, in a letter from President Clinton, the United States clearly declared that it supports the Slovak Republic. Moreover, Mr. Holbrooke is one of those diplomats and politicians who have an enormous international overview, an enormous amount of knowlegde. Therefore, to hold talks with him is a real experience, especially when the talks are long and the variety of topics and ideas is really impressive. That is why I asked for this talk. It was very useful and productive for both partners. The government of the Slovak Republic enjoys support in all its reasonable activities.

[Pospisilova] Mr. Holbrooke said after the talks that the United States is interested in the ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty by the Slovak Parliament. According to information from Hungary, our neighbors will probably ratify this document on or after 23 May. You said earlier that consultations are being held within the coalition. However, the date of the ratification by Slovakia is not known. When will you present the treaty to parliament?

[Meciar] Such an agreement is a document of enormous international importance. It does not affect our relations with Hungary or our internal affairs only—it has a broader international impact.

In the first stage, we have therefore focused on the change of water management at Gabcikovo-Nagymaros so that the treaty could pass through the Hungarian Parliament. This was our accommodating step.

In the second stage, we are focusing on external relations, that is, ministerial talks within the Council of Europe, where [Foreign Minister] Mr. Schenk gives presentations on the interpretation of Document No. 1201, so that there remain no doubts in this respect. We are holding talks with the Hungarian and the Romanian partners trying to ensure that an analogous process is accomplished in their countries as well.

With regard to the internal scene, we intend to present the treaty to parliament through a series of gradual steps. We will first present the framework agreement on the rights of ethnic minorities. We have signed this agreement and we will ratify it before the Hungarian Republic does. All this follows from the fact that our treaty with the Hungarian Republic excludes everything that contradicts this agreement.

After that, we will hold political consultations. They are already underway within the government coalition and they will be held with other, opposition parties. The objective of these consultations is to discover their stances on the treaty, to explain controversial points and secure the acceptability of the treaty.

For the time being, the other parties say that they support the treaty, but when a more concrete opinion is to be presented they start to cast doubts on it. The Slovak National Party has clearly said that it is against it. So I need to prepare conditions whereby there is no threat of a government crisis. There is already a presidential crisis. I do not want to paralyze the other component part of power.

I will therefore present the treaty to parliament as soon as these external and internal conditions are mature. I assured Mr. Holbrooke that the consultations with other political parties will begin next week.

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[Pospisilova] And what about the date? Can you give us a guess as to when the treaty will arrive in parliament for it to be ratified?

[Meciar] That depends on the overall development. It may be very soon, within several days, maybe within several weeks. I do not want to set myself deadlines, as a binding date is something that should not be broken. Hence, I do not want to set the date now.

Schenk Signs 'Privileges' Treaty With OECD

AU1505113595 Bratislava SME in Slovak 13 May 95 p 1

[TASR report: "J. Schenk Has Signed a Treaty Between Slovakia and the OECD on Privileges and Immunities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Paris—Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk signed a treaty in Paris yesterday on privileges and immunities for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the Slovak Republic. The treaty, which facilitates cooperation and assistance in the sphere of Slovak economic reforms under the conditions of a market economy, is an important step in the Slovak Republic's process affiliation to the OECD. On this occasion, Minister J. Schenk made a speech to the 25 OECD-member countries' permanent representatives.

Minister J. Schenk met with J. P. Ferriter, deputy executive director of the OECD member countries' International Energy Agency (AIE). He expressed an interest in intensifying the Slovak Republic's cooperation with the AIE. The first major step of this cooperation will be the drafting of a study of the Slovak Republic's energy policy by this generally recognized organization.

Kozlik Leads Delegation on Tour of Central Asia

LD1405105895 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 14 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A Slovak Government delegation led by Sergej Kozlik, deputy prime minister and finance minister, left today for a six-day official visit to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. The delegation includes Economics Minister Jan Ducky and Alexander Rezes, minister for transport, posts, and telecommunications, as well as Slovak businessmen. During their visit, Slovak representatives will meet political officials and economic leaders of the countries they visit, including the heads of states.

Meciar Discusses Purge of Intelligence Service

LD1405201095 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 14 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovak Intelligence Service [SIS] has attracted more attention during the past few weeks than is perhaps good. This week the press published reports about further personnel changes in its upper echelons. Our colleague Magda Pospisilova has asked Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar to confirm or deny these reports.

[begin recording] [Pospisilova] The leaked information says that the SIS counterintelligence director has already been appointed—it is allegedly Jaroslav Svechota. Mr. Prime Minister, can you confirm this information and can you also tell us who was appointed the director of the intelligence service?

[Meciar] I am sorry, but I can neither confirm nor refute this information. During my talks with [SIS director Ivan] Lexa, we concentrated on the results of SIS's work, not on personnel issues. Therefore, I am currently unable to tell you today who holds which post. I know that Lexa's primary task was to eliminate undesirable developments within the SIS—that is, to part company with those who gathered information about the members of my government, about National Council deputies representing the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], about me personally, about the HZDS and institutions and organizations that cooperated with us. They did so only on orders, but what matters is that they did so. This represents such a breach of elementary principles that not only have these people to leave but also another measure is called for. This is why we have submitted a request. In fact, Mr. Lexa has briefed me about having submitted a request to criminal prosecution bodies calling for criminal proceedings in this matter.

I also regret that in all of his endeavor the president failed to find a single word of condemnation of such practices, a single word of recognition for the victims of such practices, who include the prime minister and the parliament speaker. This is appalling.

Therefore, opposing this means fighting for the foundations of democracy, for the foundations of freedom.

If people, including me, have taken their revenge on the [former communist] state security for the past, why should we tolerate the situation when this is being done by other people in the name of the new power lords?

For this reason, I think that our society must react to these things and that it has to activate its self-defense mechanism in the interest of preserving the purity of our political life, keeping it free of these practices.

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[Pospisilova] When will the names of the new SIS officials be made public?

[Meciar] This is a matter for the SIS director. It is within his powers; in this matter he is not subordinate to the government. The Council of State Defense will hold a session and will compile a list of priorities for him. He and his service will be appraised on this basis.

It is not customary to publish the names of these officials. Moreover, in the states around us, these officials do not use their real names; they use their service code surnames and code names [krycie sluzobne jmena I krycie oznacenia] instead. In fact,. I do not know what I should announce in this case. [end recording]

Changing Relations With Czech Republic Assessed

95CH0227B Kosice DOMINO EFEKT in Slovak 6 Apr 95 p 2

[Article by Martin Schmarcz: "Specific Relationships Are Persisting"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The relationship between the Czech prime minister, Klaus, and the constantly returning prime minister of the Bratislava government, Meciar, has undergone a noteworthy development over the last three years: It has progressed from a forced alliance via pragmatic respect for the opposite player through foot-dragging surrounding questions which have not been finally resolved. The latter, to say so honestly, are more vexing for Prague than for Bratislava.

Shortly after the extraordinary parliamentary elections in Slovakia, Klaus proclaimed that he now expects to have a partner in Bratislava with a mandate to act, which was missing in the previous "temporary" government. Nevertheless, thus far neither of the prime ministers has sat down at the same table. The main cause of the delays is undoubtedly the fact that the image of the new Slovak team is, to put it mildly, of a nonstandard type, and whether anything sensible can be accomplished with it is a question. That is why Klaus is first sending his ministers to do the negotiating and is holding off on a fundamental meeting of the prime ministers.

Actually, what should Prime Minister Klaus be negotiating with his counterpart? From the Czech viewpoint, the following matters tend to, at the very least, unpleasantly obstruct what is on the joint negotiating table: the Slovak debt to the Czech National Bank [CNB], the payments agreement, and generally the fate of the customs union, particularly in light of its one-sided protective measures through which Bratislava casts doubt upon its mission.

The clearing account is the most specific example indicating that the standardization of relationships between Bratislava and Prague is not a simple task for the Czech Government. From the economic standpoint, it represents a clear burden today for the Czech Republic and maintaining it will become absolutely absurd after July of this year when the convertibility of the Czech koruna is expected to take effect. Then the constantly weakening argument on the need to conserve foreign exchange reserves in this manner and to maintain an acceptable level of mutual trade will become completely invalid. Beginning with the second half of the year, nothing should prevent mutual trade from making a smooth transition toward the use of the hard Czech koruna, even though this may clearly not meet with understanding on the part of the Slovak Government, if only for propaganda reasons.

The intention of Finance Minister Kocarnik to abrogate the clearing agreement immediately so that it would cease being valid in July is, therefore, completely understandable from the Czech standpoint. However, Klaus cast doubt upon the statement by a member of his government by saying that such a fundamental decision must await his negotiations with Meciar. Meanwhile, the proposal to do away with the clearing process has not even shown up on the program of the government. This gives rise to speculation as to whether Klaus might not be putting the brakes on abrogating an economically unsuitable agreement for political reasons—perhaps with the intention of improving the Czech position in negotiations involving the Slovak debt.

The specific difficulties in the relationship between the Czech Republic and Slovakia have their origin in the method by which they came into being: At the time both republics of the former federation were parting company, nonstandard international collaboration was not only an expression of Czecho-Slovak mutuality, but was also a pragmatic expression of the then-existing economic interests of both sides. Now that the overall situation has matured to the stage where all contacts were being accomplished on a standard international level, it turns out that this effort is running up against the unwillingness of one of the partners. This is also documented by Meciar's declaration of last week in which he stated that he would welcome a few appropriate countersteps on the part of the Czech side, without, however, specifying what he meant by this, even before the meeting of prime ministers, which is planned for April. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the Slovak minister of finance is rushing into the abrogation of the clearing agreement with just as little enthusiasm as his prime minister is rushing to pay off the claims of the CNB, it is possible to think Meciar's intentions through to the end.

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The special character of the Czecho-Slovak relationships is paradoxically attested to by the fact that the Slovak ambassador and specialist in mediation policies, Mjartan, does not hesitate to emphatically protest against the manner in which Czech journalists present information about Slovakia—most recently, television was the object of his protests. The Czech communications media are showing a greater amount of interest regarding the situation beneath the Tatra Mountains than is being shown by the other neighbors of Slovakia and, what is more, there is no language barrier here. Given the ever more official face of the Slovak electronic media, it is not surprising that, apart from ethnic Hungarians who prefer to listen to broadcasts from Budapest, many Slovaks who can tune in to Czech stations prefer to listen to news reports from Prague rather than from Bratislava. The authorities—judging by Mjartan's reaction—obviously see in this a sort of ideological subversion, even though this is more likely a manifestation of persisting cultural proximity.

Incidentally, the question of "specific" relationships with Slovakia continues to be topical for those Prague politicians whose key representative is President Havel. During a visit to his Bratislava counterpart, Kovac, Havel expressed his discomfort with developments in Slovakia. In the opinion of the majority of political observers, he thus committed a diplomatic faux pas. There is no doubt that the Meciar regime is grossly crude, but, for the time being, continues to move within the boundaries of parliamentary democracy. From the international policy standpoint, such interventions—albeit that they are popularly understandable—are somewhat unfortunate. But these are precisely the reputed "special relationships": Havel would definitely not have thought of addressing a criticism as sharp as the one he delivered against Meciar to Walesa, for example, whose political methods are also not lacking in authoritarian inclinations.

On the other hand, Meciar was grossly exaggerating when he accused Havel of endangering the meeting between the prime ministers of the two countries. Prime Minister Klaus publicly denied this fact and certainly informed the Slovak emissary Mjartan about the preparations for the meeting in detail on the occasion of the dinner for ambassadors of neighboring countries, which took place following the visit to President Kovac.

Despite ever more different developments in both parts of the former federation, specific relationships between Prague and Bratislava remain as facts: be it for political reasons such as is the case with Klaus, or for internal populist reasons, as is the case with Havel. In the long run, this would not be all bad, if both sides were to benefit from this fact. But none of the Slovak governments has hitherto provided convincing proof that it does not see these mutual interconnections only as a way toward unilateral advantages. Meciar's habit of leaning on the stronger Czech partner during international negotiations results in no benefits for Prague. Mutual relationships at the highest level would be deserving of more correctness. Private and cultural relationships are being maintained anyway on a permanent unofficial level without regard to interstate agreements and political interests.

Meciar Adds New Hurdles to Property Privatization

95CH0240A Bratislava TREND in English 19 Apr 95 p 27A

[FBIS Transcribed Text] *First Slovak Investment Doesn't Have Problems Yet With Clients, but With the State Administration.*

The Finance Ministry revoked the license of one of the largest investment companies in Slovakia, the First Slovak Investment PSIS, without publicly explaining its reasons for the move.

Though the investment company's license was taken away March 31, the ministry announced the decision on April 6.

In a brief press release, the ministry said only that "a temporary administrator has been appointed for the dividend funds and the investment funds, as well as a new depository."

The ministry appointed Harvard Investment Company and Agroinvest as administrators and Pol'nohospodarska banka as the new depository, claiming that this would provide protection for small investors.

The press release did not explain the reason for the sudden protection. Officials cite audit results.

But if the audit disclosed something that would require strict sanctions, there should be no reason to keep the audit results secret.

It also is difficult to understand why the ministry waited to impose the sanctions until March 31, when the audit of PSIS was concluded January 20.

Even though the law on investment companies and investment funds gives the ministry two months to act after the audit is completed, if the reasons for the PSIS closure were so serious, there was nothing preventing the ministry from taking the company's license.

Observers say that PSIS never had problems buying back their clients' shares at any time the clients wanted. PSIS was able to keep the payment terms earlier than required by law.

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However, the Finance Ministry probably considers the situation in the oldest Slovak investment company section because it imposed two sanctions at the same time.

Besides revoking the license, the ministry has withheld the company's right to manage the property and ordered another investment company to administrate the property temporarily. This period cannot last more than six months. During this time, PSIS shares cannot be traded.

The existing legislation on investment companies gives the Finance Ministry almost a free hand when evaluating how gravely an investment company violated the law.

Basically, the ministry can take away the investment company's license for any violation. Only this could have led to the situation when the ministry acted slowly and gradually with the investment fund PSIPS, which indeed had damaged the small shareholders, while with the fund PSIS the ministry acted abruptly.

The Association of Investment Companies and Investment Funds in Slovakia issued a statement saying that "the decision of the Finance Ministry against the First Slovak Investment Company entitles the board of directors of the Association to state that the ministry chose a premature and dangerous move without considering the possible impact on the people's trust in collective investment. Therefore, the Association asks the Finance Ministry to revise its decision on the PSIS. In the future, the Association asks the ministry to evaluate its moves against other investment funds better and base decisions on expert opinions and legal expertise."

The PSIS case will probably be solved in a courtroom. It is not only a problem between the ministry and the investment company, but also a problem for the 700,000 small shareholders in PSIS.

Many of those shareholders invested their life savings in the PSIS. The ministry's statements, flourishing with optimism about protection of a small investor, can hardly be taken with much trust.

Voucher Privatization—the Government Keeps Reducing

As decided at its session April 4, the government will reduce the property offer for voucher privatization to Sk40,000 from the planned Sk70,000, which is not only a radical deviation from the aims of the previous government, but a radical turn from the statements of the governing coalition parties.

After taking office in December 1994, the cabinet of Vladimir Meciar claimed that it would continue the moves that were carried out by the government of Jozef Moravcik concerning voucher privatization.

But it corrected the first plan to offer property worth Sk70 mn within a month, trimming it by Sk20 billion.

And then, four months after it halted preparations for the second round of privatization, the government lowered the offer by another Sk10 billion.

In the material worked out earlier last year by the previous cabinet led by Jozef Moravcik, the property offer for the upcoming second wave of voucher privatization was planned to be between Sk70 to 100 billion. With 3.4 million Slovak citizens registered to participate in the second round, the volume of property would have meant some Sk20,000 to 30,000 per capita. The new privatization ministry headed by Peter Bisak forwarded a memo to the government. In compliance with the government manifesto, the memo prefers direct sales to voucher privatization.

The memo also includes a rule that the offer for voucher privatization would be only majority portions of companies' shares.

When taking over in December, the government declared that the possibility of privatizing companies in the energy and gas industry cannot be considered for the voucher offerings.

However, the privatization ministry suggested including 30 percent of the electric energy industry into the voucher offer, reasoning with the property increase in the offer. The attempt was turned down by the Economy Ministry, which is the administrator of the electricity industry.

Most of the investment funds agree that exclusion of the energy industry companies from the voucher trade will significantly lower the attractiveness of the mass privatization program. Along with the total decrease in the volume of property and smaller shares, the lower attractiveness is another unexpected change from the rules proclaimed last year.

Before the end of its term of office, the government of Jozef Moravcik approved property worth Sk62.7 billion for voucher privatization, with a prospective increase up to Sk70 billion.

The offer from Moravcik's government was composed of two parts. One part was prepared by the Privatization Ministry and included portions of 156 companies worth Sk51 billion. The other part was compiled by the National Assets Fund (FNM), which offered shares of 139 companies from its portfolio. The FNM offer was worth Sk11.7 billion.

The present privatization minister, Peter Bisak, reevaluated his predecessor's offer and reduced it from Sk51

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billion to Sk35.5 billion. Bisak's initial ambition was to offer Sk50 billion, but this was halted by ideas of other ministers.

More than a quarter of the latest offer from the ministry are shares of the water supply companies worth Sk9.8 billion, which were not included in the previous government's offer.

After the parliament elected its new board, the FNM also lowered its offer. The new FNM list includes 81 companies, offering shares from the FNM portfolio that were worth Sk5.7 billion. The largest share portions are of the construction companies Doprastav and Hydrostav and the Povazske machinery works.

At its April session, the government ordered the privatization minister to prepare the organization and finances for the second wave of voucher privatization.

According to several government representatives, the preliminary round in which the citizens assign their voucher points to the investment funds should start in the first half of this year.

Before the round starts, the government plans to amend the legislation concerning voucher privatization.

The common point in the proposed amendments will be to limit participation of the investment funds in voucher privatization. The new legislation would decrease their rights within the privatized companies.

The Privatization Ministry believes that the preliminary round of voucher privatization will close before the end of this year.

Margita Meciarova About Herself, Her Family

95CH0206A Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 22 Mar 95 pp 8-9

[Excerpts from an interview with Dr. Margita Meciarova, wife of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, by Jergus Ferko in Bratislava; date not given: "About Family and Work, About Private Life and Politics With the Prime Minister's Wife"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *Margita Meciarova works as a child neurologist at the University Children's Hospital on Kramary in Bratislava. Husband—Vladimir Meciar, prime minister of the Slovak Republic. Children—Michal (23) is studying medicine and Vladimir (21) electrical engineering; daughter Magdalena (16) is attending high school. When I asked Mrs. Meciar for an interview, she readily agreed. A comfortable apartment on a quiet Bratislava street and good coffee created the right atmosphere.*

[Ferko] Mrs. Meciarova, as the wife of the prime minister, you belong among the first ladies of Slovakia. In spite of that, very little has been written about you. So, to begin with—what was your childhood like?

[Meciarova] I grew up in Zilina; my father was an electrical engineer and worked in the North Slovakia dispatching center, mother was a homemaker. Father was later transferred to the Main Power Management Center in Bratislava. That was a somewhat unhappy time, because my father fell ill. It was actually during that time that I became familiar with all the Bratislava hospitals. It had a great deal of influence on my decision as to what I would do in life. So, my childhood—wonderful times in Zilina, no worries about health; I had a lot of freedom and I devoted my time to figure skating.

[Ferko] How many siblings do you have?

[Meciarova] I have one sister. She is a chemical engineer and lives in Bratislava with our mother.

[Ferko] What did you carry over from your childhood to adulthood?

[Meciarova] Love for children. That is why I originally wanted to be a pediatrician, but there was a problem with that, I might have had to work in a district health center. For that reason I chose to specialize in adult neurology, and then in an entirely different way I came back through neurology to pediatrics. [passage omitted]

[Ferko] I learned that you met your husband in a hospital. When, and under what circumstances?

[Meciarova] It was in 1971, when he developed health problems after a car crash and was a patient in the department of neurology in Trencin. One day we were leaving the room where we used to have our "morning session," and a gentlemen was asking for the chairman of our department. Because the superiors are always bringing in their friends as specially favored patients, and we knew that somebody like that was expected to arrive, I was the first one to complain about what our chairman had concocted again, what kind of favored patient he was bringing to the department. And that was my attitude also during our first meeting. But later.... I was not his attending physician since I worked in the women's section. We talked together a few times, and thus it came about kind of naturally that we began to meet.

[Ferko] How much time elapsed between your first meeting and your wedding?

[Meciarova] Eleven months.

[Ferko] Where did you spend your honeymoon?

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[Meciarova] In Panorama, on Strbske Pleso.

[Ferko] How did your family life unfold? What were your economic and housing conditions?

[Meciarova] We were lucky with the apartment, because when I went to work in Trencin after graduating from medical school I applied for a cooperative apartment. My husband was working at that time in the steel plant in Dubnica as a smelter. We had to sell his Trabant in order to repay the loan which we used to furnish the apartment. And even that had to be done in installments, because my starting salary as a physician was 1,200 korunas. [passage omitted]

[Ferko] What is your view on abortion?

[Meciarova] On that subject my view is unequivocal: the mother's position must always be taken into consideration, because the mother is the bearer of life, and she is also the one who is responsible for the development of the children. I know that from the religious point of view abortion is regarded as killing, but if the mother does not want the child, in such a case, what is the worse option?

[Ferko] What is your view on spousal infidelity?

[Meciarova] Everyone has to deal with that in their own way. It depends mainly on the relationship of the two people, on what they lived through, and how they lived through it.

[Ferko] Let's move on to the post-November merry-go-round. How did your family life change from the moment your husband entered politics?

[Meciarova] I must admit that it changed in many ways; because of his heavy work schedule we constantly live just as a group of four. The entire family gets together around our table only on holidays, sometimes on Saturdays and Sundays.... Many responsibilities have fallen on my shoulders as a result.

[Ferko] And a father's authority is not missed?

[Meciarova] Certainly it is missed, for the fifth year already I am mostly alone to deal with many problems, to reprimand or commend the children, in good times and bad.

[Ferko] How did your husband's health hold up under the burden of his duties and pressures?

[Meciarova] He had physical training in Dubnica when he worked in the steel plant. And he already experienced psychological pressures in the seventies, and therefore even in that respect he has had some training.

[Ferko] When it comes to the special discipline which is called "hounding," your husband could well belong in the Guinness book of records. They accused him of almost all the sins known to man. The pressure must have been tremendous in every respect. How were you affected by it? In the good as well as the bad sense, because I do not doubt that there were times when people expressed to you their support and empathy.

[Meciarova] It has varied since 1991. In 1991, after leaving the government, it did not seem to me to be so acute, nor was there any bad reaction aimed at me. But later it intensified. Today, people can already be divided into two groups—one group will tell you clearly their no, the other that it is necessary to stand firm and carry on.

[Ferko] Did your husband sometimes fear for his life?

[Meciarova] Fear, no. But we became aware of some signs, specifically in the fall of 1990. But I prefer not to talk about it.

[Ferko] Could you tell us about some bad incident that touched a sensitive spot?

[Meciarova] It actually concerns my daughter; but in time one develops a thick skin and prefers to pay no attention to outside manifestations....

[Ferko] Did your sons experience anything like that?

[Meciarova] My sons? They did not say anything to me.... But since we are talking about people's "kindness"—one of my sons had a very unpleasant accident, he fell off his bicycle. He spent a week in the hospital, and a few days later some "kind souls" told us that he was at an HZDS [Movement for Democratic Slovakia] meeting in Svinna, and that they beat him up there.

[Ferko] Fantasy in action....

[Meciarova] Exactly. He had the accident in Zliechov in August, and the story arrived in Bratislava three months later.

[Ferko] Did it ever happen that you had to save one of your children after they suffered a rather serious injury?

[Meciarova] Even though I have always stressed the need for parental supervision and caution, our children did not avoid injuries, even with both of us present. Son Michal, when he was seven years old, fell on concrete during holidays at our cottage, and on top of that a heavy wooden beam hit him on the head. He was unconscious for about one minute, then I put cold compresses on him and immediately took him to the hospital in Trencin for an X-ray. Fortunately, nothing was broken. [passage omitted]

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[Ferko] What are the biggest problems you have at work? What bothers you the most, what would help you most if it changed in your place of work?

[Meciarova] In the hospital we have a big problem with the electroencephalogram (EEG), the recordings of which are very important in the diagnosis of epilepsy. That is why a foundation for curing epilepsy was established. The university children's hospital has no money to buy a new EEG, and that is why we are trying this way of raising money. Our hospital could also use a CT scanner (tomograph), because small children, newborns, must be taken to other hospitals for examination, and it is not very good for a sick child to be moved.

[Ferko] Do you ever hear from your former patients?

[Meciarova] Oh, yes. They write, or they come to my office. It is gratifying, and I get a special feeling when I treat children of my former patients. Or if I treat the children of those children.

[Ferko] Do you have any ceremonial duties as the wife of the prime minister? How do you manage them?

[Meciarova] If protocol requires my presence during official visits, then, of course, I take part in them.

[Ferko] Do you speak any foreign languages?

[Meciarova] I speak German well, and some English.

[Ferko] Dσ you like those official functions?

[Meciarova] One meets many interesting people there, learns many things which otherwise one would not have the occasion to learn. I like social life very much, so I also like the official functions.

[Ferko] A mother, a physician, and three children. Usually in a family where there are children, one of the parents makes a sacrifice. Did your husband make the sacrifice?

[Meciarova] It was a mutual sacrifice. While I was working, he had the responsibility for preparing dinner and putting the children to bed.

[Ferko] How does your husband treat your daughter and sons? He is a resolute, authoritarian man, a strong personality. How is he in family communication when there is a conflict, or when there may be a need to teach a lesson?

[Meciarova] There is a discussion with a clear result.

[Ferko] Does he have the same relationship with all the children, or does he have a favorite?

[Meciarova] With fathers it is usually the daughter, so Magduska is the one who usually wins.

[Ferko] You said that you like social life. What else do you enjoy, what is your favorite means of relaxation?

[Meciarova] I like to go to concerts very much. I like Beethoven the best, then Chopin, I love piano and organ music. In the evenings I read, but usually only a little, and now almost exclusively technical literature.

[Ferko] Do you agree with the political views of your husband?

[Meciarova] In most cases, yes.

[Ferko] And in what instances not?

[Meciarova] One does not divulge that. Simply, when he says some things right up front, there often is an unpleasant reaction.

[Ferko] The fact that he speaks too candidly is perhaps one of the most criticized faults of your husband....

[Meciarova] He speaks too candidly and sometimes he says more than he should. Then it is used against him. It is only later that it becomes obvious that he was right, but at the beginning it is a different matter.

[Ferko] If HZDS did not exist, which movement or political party would you favor?

[Meciarova] In that case, only SNS [Slovak National Party].

[Ferko] Do you go to church?

[Meciarova] I used to go quite regularly, but now, somehow... better not put that in the newspaper. Before certain politicians started making those comments about it, I used to go. But when I saw what they were doing.... Bringing politics and hatred into the church, that is not right.

[Ferko] Before the elections, Mr. Meciar seemed to imply that he will merely lead HZDS through the elections but will no longer be the prime minister.

[Meciarova] He has a great sense of responsibility. And he knows one thing very well: even given all the pressures and criticisms heaped on him, once he set out on this road it would be impossible for him to retreat and leave politics. That would be even worse.

[Ferko] But that is rather self-destructive.

[Meciarova] He realizes that.

[Ferko] Tell us, what is the condition of your husband's health?

[Meciarova] Good.

[Ferko] Do you like to travel?

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[Meciarova] Yes, and the places which I like to visit and which I reminisce about are those where my husband and I used to go. Our first excursions were to Vrsatec, then to Rychnava. These are the two places I like to return to the most.

[Ferko] If your husband were not a politician, what do you think he should be?

[Meciarova] When he graduated from law school and began to work in Nemsova, he often represented people in legal matters. I said at that time that he would make an outstanding prosecutor.

[Ferko] Where did you travel abroad? Were you able to travel at the time your husband was an enterprise attorney?

[Meciarova] We never travelled abroad. We usually spent our vacations in Slovakia. Only once when I was working as a physician to a group of sportsmen I visited Italy with them.

[Ferko] Do you have a desire to travel abroad?

[Meciarova] I would like to visit Rome and the Vatican. I don't know if it will ever come true for me.

[Ferko] How do you spend your vacations?

[Meciarova] We keep busy. It means that for one month we usually stay in our country cottage. The natural surroundings there are beautiful at any season. Whether it rains or snows, it still is lovely there. We have a large garden which has to be taken care of, in fact, we grow all our own vegetables. At this time, for example, I have no need to look for potatoes, we have our own.

[Ferko] Why doesn't your husband drink alcohol? For a Slovak, that is almost a "negative" trait.

[Meciarova] He probably does not like it.... At Christmastime he allows himself a jigger of cognac, even has some wine—but only a glassful. During some holidays he may have a glass of champagne.

[Ferko] He mostly does not even drink coffee....

[Meciarova] Because he was overcaffeinated. During the first years he used to drink an awful lot of it, and it obviously did not do him any good, so now he has switched to tea. But earlier, in Trencin, he did not drink coffee. When he went to Bratislava, that is when he began to drink it—as many as three or four cups a day.

[Ferko] How much sleep does your husband get each day?

[Meciarova] Well, very little. But he already had trouble sleeping in Trencin. He used to work late into the night.... But obviously this has to do with Dubnica where he worked a triple shift. That upsets one's daily routine.

[Ferko] How is it today—how much sleep does he get?

[Meciarova] Three hours, no more.

[Ferko] People who can do with little sleep are said to be the progeny of the keepers of the flame....

[Meciarova] My husband has researched his family tree, three generations back, I believe. His ancestors were mostly farmers.

[Ferko] What are your favorite foods?

[Meciarova] Steak, best of all steak Tartar.

[Ferko] But that is almost illegal today.... And how do you feel about cooking?

[Meciarova] After we moved to Bratislava, my cooking got worse. I prepare lunch regularly, but dinner is quite often cold. What do the children like best? Noodles with cheese. But I cook everything.

[Ferko] And housework?

[Meciarova] Same thing. Everything. Fortunately, my mother freed me from having to do needlework, she sews and knits for the whole family. Occasionally I have done some embroidery, but that was when I had more time.

[Ferko] How do you spend your evenings, how much time do you spend watching television?

[Meciarova] At most a half-hour, no more—I watch mainly Television News. Mostly I listen to the radio. The boys, provided they are home in the evening, spend time at the computer, I cook.

[Ferko] Do you drive?

[Meciarova] Yes.

[Ferko] Are you a good driver?

[Meciarova] Last year was rather bad, we had some accidents, but I think that I am a good driver.

[Ferko] It was your husband who hit the bus with Austrian tourists?

[Meciarova] Yes.

[Ferko] Were they very surprised?

[Meciarova] They were (laughter). But at that time I realized that in an accident it is worse to be the passenger than the driver. You look, you see, but you cannot do anything. In the case of the Austrian tourists, the accident was caused by the road being slippery.

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[Ferko] And your accidents?

[Meciarova] One of them was unpleasant—it happened last year. I had to go to Trencin very early in the morning and then quickly back to Bratislava. At the intersection of Riazanska street, two pedestrians, elderly gentlemen, started to cross on red light. The driver in front of me stepped on the brakes, and I ran into him. I am used to driving fast, but that time, fortunately, I was going slowly, otherwise it would have been much worse. Nothing serious happened to anybody, I just wrecked the car.

[Ferko] Have you attended many meetings of HZDS, and what impressions do you bring from them?

[Meciarova] It depends.

[Ferko] When did politics have the most unsettling effect on you?

[Meciarova] In March last year.

[Ferko] How did you deal with it?

[Meciarova] At that time, I would sit in front of the television for hours for the first time in my life. I listened to the speeches in the parliament—the president's, Weiss's, my husband's.... What happened then was for me the worst of all the political events until now.

[Ferko] Are you getting any letters?

[Meciarova] It is quiet now, fewer letters are coming in.

[Ferko] Do you write back to anyone?

[Meciarova] Anonymous letters usually end up in the wastebasket, but they have to be read—one at least forms a picture about the people who wrote them. I have answered quite a few of the nice and sensible letters.

[Ferko] Let's go back to March of last year—that was kind of a magical time. When did you begin to sense that something was going on?

[Meciarova] To tell you the truth, already in September, six months earlier. I cannot explain it, but that sixth sense somehow works for me. I don't even know how to put it.... It is not rationally acceptable.

[Ferko] But even intuition can be acceptable, especially in politics, where it is perhaps the most important factor.

[Meciarova] I try to evaluate people not by what they say, but rather by what they do, and I am usually right. At that time, year before last in the fall, I used to meet a number of people, and sometimes there was something that did not seem quite right about them.

[Ferko] Are you talking about politicians whom you do not wish to name?

[Meciarova] Yes.

[Ferko] In other words, last March was your worst contact with politics. How did you feel about what happened to your husband and about how those, whom we shall not name, treated him?

[Meciarova] It was a "confession" with accusations which were untrue. That "confession" was to bring expurgation and place all blame on a single person, a "bad man," my husband. In politics one cannot, obviously, avoid such things, it is not an altogether clean game....

[Ferko] In connection with last March, the opinion was put forth that it was a coup d'etat of the substandard. Would you agree with such an assessment, is it far from the truth?

[Meciarova] No.

[Ferko] People, who did not leave behind a lot of accomplishments, have become now, after changing their political stripe, the greatest critics of the situation in departments which they themselves headed prior to this. Many of them are accusing Meciar of being authoritarian.

[Meciarova] But authoritarianism can be, after all, understood in different ways. Moreover, if somebody wants to do a good job and gives orders in a certain way, he must necessarily be authoritarian.

[Ferko] Did your husband ever express to you a special feeling of satisfaction on achieving something important that he had striven for over a long period of time?

[Meciarova] He expressed the greatest satisfaction with the proclamation of sovereignty and the passing of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic.

[Ferko] Did you celebrate?

[Meciarova] Yes.

[Ferko] And not just with tea?

[Meciarova] (laughing) Not just with tea.

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Clinton Favors Russia Over East Europe

AU1205154395 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 12 May 95 p 3

[Editorial by Pal Lederer: "Volatile Illusions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is a matter of viewpoint whether we see Bill Clinton's and Boris Yeltsin's seventh Moscow summit as a success or a failure. However, one thing is certain: Nothing good has resulted from it for Hungary and the other East and Central European countries that are trying to get under the NATO umbrella, except, perhaps, for the fact that it has again been made clear that the time has come for the former Eastern Bloc's countries, which are left without a defense alliance and are desperately trying to find protection, to get rid of some illusions. First of all, with the illusion that, for the West, small (smaller than Russia) countries are more important than the eastern nuclear power, therefore, NATO will treat them in some special way. Probably the opposite of this is true: Russia continues to be more equal among the equals. To prove this statement, it is not even necessary to analyze what Clinton did or said in Moscow; it is enough to cast a glance at two German politicians, namely Chancellor Kohl and his predecessor Helmut Schmidt. In an interview for a German television company on the eve of the Moscow victory celebrations, Kohl actually admitted that, in spite of the Chechen crisis and the domestic political chaos, the only thing to be done is to seek Yeltsin's (or should he disappear from the scene, his successor's) favors. Although Kohl did not mention NATO—Bonn is most strongly against Russia's admission, at least in words—however, when he indicated that Russia is the dominant country east of Germany, he probably also thought that well, yes, if this is the price of security, then we will most likely also have to yield in favor of Moscow even on the NATO issue. At the same time, former Chancellor Schmidt said that he would not see much point in the Central European countries'—including Hungary's—NATO membership because the organization's troops would not be stationed east of Germany anyway (lest they frighten the Russians). If we add to all this the not so new but now spectacularly repeated U.S. view that Russia's exclusion from NATO cannot be a basic stance (in other words, either Russia should also be admitted, or no one should be admitted), then the main message of the Clinton-Yeltsin summit can be deduced: Moscow first and foremost!

It would be a harmful naivity to believe that Russia joining NATO's Partnership for Peace program and the "special relationship" between the organization and Moscow do not mean that the Russians can indeed veto NATO's eastern extension if this is not done in accordance with their wishes, and Clinton has become a partner to this. The U.S. President obviously believes that it is contrary to NATO's logic to keep Russia out of the Alliance if the processes of democratization and capitalist transformation are irreversible in Russia. Extension against Russia's wishes would favor the Russian forces of the restoration of the old order—Yeltsin must have convinced the U.S President on this. In spite of all this, it might still be too early to talk about a new Yalta.

Christian Democrats Not To Support Goncz

LD1205134095 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1300 GMT 12 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Christian Democratic People's Party is only willing to support such a candidate for the post of president of the republic whose political past is clean, and who is not committed to any party. Therefore, Arpad Goncz is unacceptable for the Christian Democrats. The parliamentary group and the board of the party hope that the opposition forces will start talks as soon as next week about a possible common presidential candidate.

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'Text' of Appeal for Review of Kuklinski Case

WS1205144595 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 7 Apr 95 p 17

["Full text" of "Special Review" of sentence passed against Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski for alleged espionage activities in the 1980's]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The president of the Supreme Court motioned on 30 March 1995 a special review of the case against Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, in Kuklinski's favor. The review was signed by acting Supreme Court President Stanislaw Rudnicki, president of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court. We are publishing the full text of this document, omitting names of witnesses. Subheads and bolding are ours.*

Special Review of the sentence passed by the Court of the Warsaw Military District dated 23 May 1984 (ref. So 183/84).

On the basis of Article 463, Paragraph 1 and Article 591 Paragraph 1 of the Penal Procedure Code, I am hereby appealing against the aforementioned sentence in its entirety in favor of Ryszard Jerzy Kuklinski.

On the basis of Article 376, Article 386, Article 387 Point 2 of the Penal Procedure Code, I am hereby filing charges of an infringement of procedural regulations which could influence the content of the sentence, in particular:

a) Article 3 Paragraph 1, Article 4 Paragraph 1, Article 357, and Article 372 Paragraph 1 Point 1 of the Penal Procedure Code—on the grounds that the sentence was based on circumstances insufficiently substantiated by evidence presented during the trial, facts were ascertained on the basis of presumptions, and evidence was not evaluated objectively, with disregard for extenuating circumstances,

b) Article 360 Paragraph 2 Point 1, jointly with Article 295 Paragraph 1 Point 2 of the Penal Procedure Code—on the grounds that the overall description of the deed provided for by Article 122 of the Penal Procedure Code which was imputed and attributed without an indication of the type of information delivered and hereby move for repealing the sentence and submitting the case to the prosecutor for a completion of the preparatory proceedings.

Substantiation

In its verdict of 23 May 1984, the Court of the Warsaw Military District (ref. So 183/84) found Colonel R.J. Kuklinski guilty of the following offenses:

1) On 7 November 1981, he acted with intent to permanently avoid military service, abandoned his military unit, and traveled to the Federal Republic of Germany, and then to the United States of America. This act is regarded as an offense on the basis of Article 304 Paragraph 3 of the Penal Procedure Code, and the offender was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment;

2) having left the country on 8 November, acting for the benefit of U.S. intelligence, he relayed information which jeopardized the basic security and defense of the Polish People's Republic in the course of debriefings at CIA Headquarters in Virginia, near Washington, which equals state treason, i.e. an offense on the basis of Article 122 of the Penal Procedure Code, for which he was sentenced to death, deprivation of civic rights forever, and confiscation of possessions. The Court issued a concurrent sentence of death, confiscation of possessions, and deprivation of civic rights forever. The sentence, issued by default, was not appealed and became effective on 31 May 1984.

In a decree dated 27 September 1984, the Council of State decided against exercising its right to grant a pardon.

On 15 March 1990, the Court of the Warsaw Military District issued a decision on the basis of the Amnesty Law of 7 December 1989 (Journal of Law Vol. 64, No. 390) and reduced the sentence of 15 years to 10 years imprisonment, commuted the death penalty to 25 years imprisonment, reduced the additional penalty of deprivation of civic rights to 10 years, and remitted the unfulfilled sentence of confiscation of all possessions; as a final sentence the Court decreed 25 years' imprisonment and 10 years' deprivation of civic rights.

The appealed sentence was issued with an infringement of many procedural regulations, which may have influenced the content of the ruling.

Insubstantial Evidence

The act based on Article 122 of the Penal Procedure Code was described in the indictment as well as the sentence in such general terms that not even the type of information passed on to U.S. intelligence was specified. It is worth noting that an indictment must clearly identify the charged action, otherwise it has to be reviewed and completed. The same requirement applies in particular to the verdict, which should include a specific ascertainment of the action for which the defendant is sentenced. Otherwise, it is impossible to evaluate either the degree of danger posed by the deed to the public well-being, or the extent of the perpetrator's offense, rendering it impossible to mete out a just sentence. Thus the very nature of the deed is unclear. Above all, the defendant has no means of mounting an efficient defense.

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Moreover, the legal grounds for the sentence passed by the Court raise serious doubts. Some of the Court's decisions, pertaining to marginal issues anyway, were based on highly limited evidence. Concerning the most important questions, for instance whether and how R.J. Kuklinski had committed the crimes of which he was accused and then sentenced, the Court acted on presumption of guilt, unacceptable according to Polish law, as well as on official notes and press material.

The one thing that is clear is that due to his professional duties (up until 7 November 1981 he headed the First Division of General Planning in the General Staff of the Polish Army) R.J. Kuklinski had at his disposal information concerning the defense and security of the People's Republic of Poland, as well as highly important materials concerning the states of the Warsaw Pact. The remaining ascertainments reached by the Court, including a description of how R.J. Kuklinski left Poland, are either unsubstantiated by evidence disclosed during trial, or are based on materials which do not fulfill the evidentiary requirements stated in the Penal Procedure Code.

In the justification of the appeal verdict, the Court relies primarily on the testimonies of witnesses: (...) (both are from the Internal Military Service [WSW] headquarters) and on documents itemized as 729-730. This is the very evidence the Court considered as sufficient verification of the offenses charged against R.J. Kuklinski.-

A closer analysis of those "crucial" evidence items questions their real evidentiary value.

First and foremost, the item which the Court refers to as a document (k.729-730) is in reality a superficial memorandum from WSW headquarters, which does not have evidentiary value. It was deemed as such—i.e., devoid of evidentiary value—by the Court of the Warsaw Military District in a statement returning the case for completing the investigation (item 751), issued on 9 April 1984. The undocumented information in this memorandum pertained to: the method by which the Kuklinski family was transferred abroad, the involvement of U.S. intelligence representatives in the operation, the Kuklinski's stay at CIA Headquarters in Virginia near Washington, and—finally—the disclosure of all data known to R.J. Kuklinski concerning the defense and security of the Polish People's Republic. Part of this "information" was taken from an article published by the THE WASHINGTON POST on 23 January 1982 (item 461). The person described, though, was not a colonel, but rather a general from Poland, who requested political asylum in West Europe for himself and his family, who was most probably transferred to Virginia by the CIA (in the WSW headquarters memorandum this presumption was taken for fact).

Not only did the testimony given by witnesses (...) add anything new to the case, but they do not even have evidentiary value. These are hearsay witnesses of a special kind. Their statements (...) merely echo the memorandum of WSW headquarters from item 729-730 and are as general as the memorandum itself. The testimony, which summarizes the conclusions they reached while working for WSW, refer to covert intelligence and counterintelligence operations. This deprives the Court of the ability to verify the statements, and thus debilitates the statements as full-value evidence. It is worth pointing out that (...) conducted the investigation in this case. The roles of witness and the person in charge of preparatory proceedings were combined, a concurrence customarily deemed inadmissible.

No Base for Adjudication

Because of the above-mentioned discrepancies, the Court finally issued a sentence despite the lack of sufficient evidence of guilt. The Court's stand is inconsistent and incomprehensible. It is the very court which returned the case records to complete the investigation, pointing out that basing the indictment on speculations and notes (item 751-753) was inadmissible. Also the letter (signed by the chairman of the Court) sent to the secretariat of the National Defense Committee while the trial was already under way, stressed the fact that the evidentiary material is very limited (item 780-781). The further hearing of two witnesses did not change anything in this respect. There were still no sufficient evidentiary grounds, not only for passing the sentence, but even for filing the indictment.

Here we have to point out that the fact of conducting the trial of R.J. Kuklinski by default did not absolve judicial bodies from ensuring the accuracy of the proceedings, from gathering evidence which unequivocally stated the guilt of the defendant, or from accounting for all extenuating circumstances. On the contrary. As the Supreme Court rightfully pointed out in its sentence of 21 September 1989 (ref. WRN 26/89), the fact that the defendant was not present at the trial calls for a particularly thorough procedure so as to prevent any violation of procedural rules, especially those protecting the defendants' rights, and the sentence should be based on evidence which absolutely and unequivocally confirms the guilt of the defendant. If the evidence is not unequivocal, and how it is assessed depends on explanations given by the defendant, the adjudication of the case by this particular procedure (i.e. by default) is inadmissible.

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Motives Have To Be Analyzed

Regardless of the aforementioned objections to a blatant offense against the basic rules of Polish criminal procedure, which must lead to a repeal of the verdict, one must raise further questions which, if answered, could lead to a reappraisal of the deed of which R.J. Kuklinski is accused.

The inefficiency of attempts at clarifying R. Kuklinski's guiding motives is difficult to sanction. In spite of the extraordinary inquisitiveness and a long search, the prosecution did not succeed in disclosing any evidence which would state that R. Kuklinski's motive was, for example, the prospect of material gain, and the Court rightfully turned down such a suggestion. Although the offense under Article 122 of the Code of Penal Procedure does not fall into the category of intentional offenses, and the currently effective penal code treats such elements as intent, incentive, or motive of an action—according to Article 50—only as circumstances influencing the sentence, it is nonetheless impossible not to accept that determining these elements undoubtedly serves to fully clarify and understand the intention of the deed as well as an appropriate evaluation of its very nature.

Explaining the intention which influences the purpose and choice of means renders an explanation of the motives of certain action easier. The motives, which are a kind of intellectual experience, explain the reasons of certain behavior of the perpetrator. There is no need to prove that the reasons as well as motives are not always of a negative kind. There are also noble motives, such as saving life, defending one's community, or protecting the sovereignty and independence of one's own country. Ascertaining the motive of an action enables positive or negative evaluation of a deed. But in the case analyzed, the ruling Court did not consider these issues worthy of interest.

State of Higher Necessity

There is no doubt that ascertaining the fact that R. Kuklinski acted in the interest of the sovereignty and independence of the country exclusively for ideological reasons should impel his acquittal. There is no need to prove that the sovereignty of one's own country is a higher good than fidelity to the soldier's oath. This is not an easy issue as it is difficult to accept everybody's right to an individual interpretation of obligations inherent in the military oath and the duty of serving one's Motherland. It is nonetheless worth considering whether the action taken by R. Kuklinski, who had access to the deepest secrets of the Warsaw Pact states and had evidence of the indisputable hegemony of the former Soviet Union over them, should not be accounted for on the plane of the countertype [kontratyp] provided for in Article 23 of the Penal Procedure Code, namely as action in a state of higher necessity.

Looking into this matter and evaluating the very injunction of action in the state of higher necessity, one should account for the widely known fact that Poland's sovereignty was seriously impaired and that there was an imminent threat of an invasion by the Soviet Union and other bordering members of the former Warsaw Pact, as well as the fact that R. Kuklinski was fully abreast of the situation and—with his desperate action—tried to divert the impending threat of invasion by informing leaders of states powerful enough to influence the world's fate. With the benefit of hindsight we can now verify earlier evaluations of the legal character of certain ideological activity, which only formally violated regulations of the Penal Code.

Without forejudging the future legal assessment of R. Kuklinski's deeds once the necessary supplementation of evidence—collected and secured in compliance with procedural rules and evaluated in a way allowing full freedom and objectivity—is finalized, it should be noted that there are reasons justifying consideration of the activities which may fall under the provisions of Article 23 of the Penal Code.

Escape as a Means to an End

The law does not provide for any limitations concerning interests which may be protected by sacrificing other interests, albeit state security is beyond any doubt superior to disclosing a secret, particularly if it is disclosed for the sake of serving a higher interest. This particular disclosure, which implied informing the world of the danger of an invasion and the imminent introduction of Martial Law, would not have been possible had Kuklinski not left the country. The sovereignty and independence of the state and protecting it from the danger of an invasion is an interest protected by law. There was no other way to avoid danger. Although, according to Article 23 of the Penal Procedure Code, danger is in fact usually the result of sudden, unexpected circumstances, it may be caused by a continuing threat. There are no legal limitations. It needs to be clarified how real the threat of invasion was at that particular time.

Evaluating R. Kuklinski's deeds, one has to consider the fact that both charges brought against him are very closely related, although separate provisions of the Penal Code were formally applied. They are essentially one and the same deed. Obviously, it would have been impossible to commit the actions specified in Article 122 of the Penal Code without crossing the border illegally. A legal crossing of the border was

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inconceivable at the time. The deed should thus be regarded as a means of facilitating the performance of the main deed, as provided for by Article 122 of the Penal Code, which was to warn about the imminent invasion and the impending imposition of Martial Law. The crossing of the border may also be attributed to the reluctance of being personally involved in the operations connected with introducing Martial Law, as well as to the justified and real fear of losing life.

The Completion of Preparatory Proceedings

The aforementioned reasons show that the sentence passed on 23 May 1984 was pronounced with a blatant violation of legal procedures and blatantly violates the law. The defective verdict must thus be annulled and the case must be returned for further preparatory procedures Returning the case to the prosecutor to complete preparatory procedures, and not to the Court for renewed consideration, is justified by the need to conduct an elaborate search for further evidence, which naturally falls under the competence not of the Court, but the prosecution. The Court would additionally encounter serious difficulties in performing operations related to the search. Moreover, the preparatory procedures, according to the provisions of Article 261 of the Penal Procedure Code is targeted primarily at establishing whether an offense was actually committed and gathering and fixing material evidence for the Court. These requirements were not met in the hitherto proceedings in the manner recommended by the effective laws.

The Court is incapable of gathering all the necessary evidence. The need will definitely arise to clarify many issues in this case. It may be particularly vital to obtain information from Soviet and U.S. archives, contact the secret services of those states, and reach and question numerous individuals who are known to be in possession of information concerning the threat of invasion and the imposition of Martial Law.

In light of the above arguments, the charges and conclusions included in the motion to review the verdict are fully valid.

Polish, Lithuanian Defense Ministers Sign Protocol

LD1205133695 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1307 GMT 12 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 12 May—Polish-Lithuanian protocols were signed today by National Defense Minister Zbigniew Okonski and Lithuanian Defense Minister Linas Linkeviciuson on a system of airspace control and on bilateral military cooperation within the Partnership for Peace program. During his two-day visit, the Lithuanian guest had meetings with Deputy Prime Minister Aleksander Luczak and deputies of the Sejm National Defense Commission.

The protocol on airspace control provides for consultations on technical control of the airspace and an exchange of information on introducing standards and procedures compatible with NATO systems.

The protocol on cooperation within the Partnership for Peace provides for an exchange of experiences regarding the organization of contingents for peace forces. Joint participation in these forces is also envisaged. Probably in 1996, a Polish-Lithuania battalion will be formed. Until then, the Polish side proposes participation of a Lithuanian subunit in one of the Polish battalions serving in the peace forces.

Among the topics discussed during the meeting on 11 May between Deputy Prime Minister Luczak and Minister Linkevicius was the cooperation of both countries on the issue of joining NATO and the implementation of the Partnership for Peace program. During the talks yesterday with members of the Sejm National Defense Commission, the Lithuanian guest familiarized himself with the work of the Commission and the Sejm in the defense sphere. Civil and democratic control over the Army was also discussed.

Kwasniecki Enters Presidential Race

LD1305115895 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1131 GMT 13 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 13 May—Aleksander Kwasniewski was elected today as the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic party's candidate in the presidential election during the party's fourth convention. Of 300 delegates to the convention, 296 voted for his candidacy.

Interviewed by Radio Zet

LD1105154995 Warsaw Radio Zet Network in Polish 0615 GMT 11 May 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Radio Zet's guest this morning is Aleksander Kwasniewski, Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] leader. Good morning, sir.

[Kwasniewski] Good morning.

[Unidentified correspondent] Did you expect that the president's lawyers would prepare the motion to put Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy before the State Tribunal?

[Kwasniewski] In Poland we have a rich tradition of April Fools' Day, but extending it to last for the whole year and making jokes for 12 months is a gross exaggeration. I think that if this motion is submitted, there is no way to treat it but as a poor joke. There is

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no legal justification for it, nor are there any political grounds; and after all, you know that Polish entry into the European structures will require quite a lot of effort and activity on our part, that from us it will require acting on our own behalf and showing Poland's strength in all these negotiations; therefore, such actions do not make any sense. They bring about exactly the opposite result and they make Poland a subject of ridicule. They do not make us more credible, and bring a smile to the faces of all who do not wish us well.

[Correspondent] Did the prime minister break the Constitution or not by going to Moscow?

[Kwasniewski] He did not break anything, of course The prime minister is the head of the government, and foreign policy is within the government's remit; there were attempts to agree upon the list of people going to these ceremonies, but since they were state ceremonies, representatives of the government, representatives of the parliament, and representatives of the president had equal rights to participate in them. It was not that the ceremonies were exclusively for the president and that he had exclusive rights to decide on the composition of the delegation.

I generally believe that we are talking about an issue of third-rate importance, and we forget that the most important issue from the point of view of Poland's interests was to be present there. It is a good thing that Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski addressed the Bundestag, it is a good thing he went to London, it is a good thing that Professor Bronislaw Geremek [chairman of Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission] went to Paris, and it is a very good thing that Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy and Andrzej Zakrzewski went to Moscow. Although separately each of the meetings they held may be of minor importance, on the whole they all have a necessary importance in the whole structure of our concept, which is the unification of Europe and ensuring that Poland has a significant place in it. On the other hand, this whole storm and all this scolding from the president are simply an obstacle on this road. In my opinion, they serve Poland badly.

[Correspondent] And if the president signs such a motion, what happens with it later?

[Kwasniewski] There is a special procedure and the State Tribunal may not have to deal with such issues immediately. I think the whole thing will be done in keeping with those procedures and will be assessed properly by the parliament as well as by the State Tribunal. On the other hand, there is the question whether we really want to bring Poland closer to Slawomir Mrozek [Polish playwright famous for his Theatre of the Absurd plays], or a more serious image.

[Correspondent] Do you think this will be one of the elements of the president's electoral campaign aimed, after all, against you?

[Kwasniewski] This is one of the elements of the electoral campaign. President Lech Walesa, I suppose, now mainly thinks about the electoral campaign, but I do not think that this is going to play an essential role in the campaign. Neither do I think that nominations awarded left, right, and center can play any essential role in it.

[Correspondent] How do you see this latest nomination of Marek Jurek [to the post of National Radio and TV Broadcasting Council, KRRiTV, chairman]? [passage omitted] Will he be a good head of the KRRiTV, and how do you assess this nomination from the political point of view?

[Kwasniewski] I think that Marek Jurek is a well known fundamentalist politician who has a very clear vision, which very few Polish politicians have. He is a politician of clearly conservative and Christian concept and ideology. On the other hand, I do not know whether or not he will be a good chairman of the council. This is a completely new activity for him of which, I suppose, he knows little since it concerns the law, it concerns technical issues, and it concerns the whole complexity of the phenomenon of order in the airwaves.

One thing is certain: this decision has a political nature. I do not know whether it is aimed at his reconciliation with the Christian National Union [ZChN]—he is the second member of the ZChN in the national council; let me recall that Mr. Szafraniec was also a senator from the ZChN. What is certain here is that the president has proven that all his claims that the council is apolitical and independent are just mere words. He simply took a political decision and appointed one of the most political people in Poland. Fortunately, the council works collectively and decisions belong to all its members, not just the chairman; and how they will arrange relations with Mr. Marek Jurek and how Marek Jurek will arrange his relations with them, only time will tell.

[Correspondent] ZChN leaders claim that Marek Jurek will put a halt to the left-wing offensive on public television and thwart attempts at Wieslaw Walendziak's [chairman of Polish Television] dismissal.

[Kwasniewski] I do not know what the left-wing offensive on public television is. I know what public television is, and if Mr. Marek Jurek is to act as a counterbalance to Wieslaw Walendziak, then the whole thing becomes strange. On the other hand, if he is going to be

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an additional support for the line represented by public television, then I protest against it because I believe that this would be a violation of the principle of independent television, which has been fighting for that independence with difficulties. In my view, it would be a one-directional treatment of the political concept of television.

On the other hand, I want to make it clear that the Left makes no attempts at plotting anything against Walendziak. Like any other viewer and citizen, the Left has a right to express its views about television programming. Personally, I assess these programs—especially the current affairs programs, since I watch these most often—as being quite poor, and sometimes even politically one-sided. The assessment of the television board can only be done by the supervisory or programmatic council, or the national council, and these are the authorized bodies for taking decisions in television and radio, so we cannot do anything here. We will be discussing in the Sejm the KRRiTV annual report and we will be assessing whether the council performed its tasks well or not, and whether its mandate can be extended or not.

[Correspondent] How do you assess the outcome of the Clinton-Yeltsin summit meeting?

[Kwasniewski] I think this is proof that relations in the world still have not entered the stage of mutual love, that there are many conflicts and difficulties. I think that the most important conclusion for us from this summit is that we have to count on ourselves to a greater degree, we have to be more consistent, more unified in the way we act. [passage omitted] The truth is that if we want to build our position—I will not mention the economy, which has to be effective—politically we have to move toward clear, good relations with the West; we must talk to the Russians and show that we can find agreement with them. We must enter European structures by means of consistent diplomacy and policy, not hoping that we will be given concessions as a gift. There are no gifts in this respect.

[Correspondent] But we have been doing this for at least the past five years.

[Kwasniewski] We have, but I think we are still further than closer from the objective. It does not mean that after this summit meeting we have been cast aside; no, but it shows that talks will be difficult, hard, and that nobody will give up his positions easily. On the other hand, listening to the president, sometimes I have the impression that we are expecting a gift, that for our historical contributions, for our suffering, for our abolishing communism, for our struggle for democracy, somebody will, for example, produce a beautifully packaged gift of membership for us in the EU and NATO, will put it on the table and say: our dear Poles, here is a gift for you. Nothing like that will ever happen. But in these activities we often disturb each other, which is bad.

[Correspondent] And the Clinton-Yeltsin was assessed, is being assessed, as the Russian president's success.

[Kwasniewski] I do not know. You would perhaps have to... [changes thought] those observers who were in Moscow know better, they heard opinions and commentaries, but this summit meeting does not begin or end any of the processes. I think these talks will continue further. You have to remember that both President Yeltsin and Bill Clinton are entangled in internal politics. They both face elections next year and there are different pressures being exerted on them; but as I say, these summit meetings will continue, some of them will be better, some worse; and what we will be worth and how credible we will be, will depend on how much we will be able to achieve here in Poland.

[Correspondent] Both politicians face elections next year, and maybe you, too. Will you be an official candidate for president as of 13 May?

[Kwasniewski] I think that the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] congress should determine its idea of participation in the presidential elections on 13 May. We will see how it turns out. If my colleagues decide I should take part in these elections, then obviously I will take up the challenge. Even today, you can see that it will not be easy, that we will have a heated campaign, I'm sure. But since there are a few days left until the 13 May, I am leaving it without an answer.

[Correspondent] But is there an alternative? Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, deputy Sejm speaker, said the SLD should perhaps put forward just one nonparty candidate. Is such a possibility taken into consideration at all?

[Kwasniewski] We discussed different concepts many times in narrow groups; the concept of one nonparty candidate was also on the agenda; but to produce some effect, there must be talks, joint decisions, and a search for a joint programmatic level. Unfortunately, this has not happened, either with the Freedom Union [UW] or with the Labor Union [UP]. Jacek Kuron's case at the UP congress shows that sometimes such contrived political concepts do not find support in people. We are the party enjoying the highest positions in different polls. I have been in first place for many, many months. It would therefore be difficult to explain why we should be looking for another candidate. [passage omitted]

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[Correspondent] Briefly speaking, there is no choice, and this will happen on 13 May: Mr. Aleksander Kwasniewski will become the candidate...

[Kwasniewski, interrupting] [words indistinct] and that is why this discussion on 13 May will be interesting and there will be a vote on this. But if we...

[Correspondent, interrupting] You say that there is a choice, but it is not evident.

[Kwasniewski] There is a choice between the concept to be presented by Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, perhaps, and other colleagues. Maybe we should keep talking about another candidate. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Who will be your opponent—the opponent who, according to you, you will most probably meet in the second round, because such a choice has to be made from among 20 candidates.

[Kwasniewski] Are there 20 already?

[Correspondent] Maybe there are even more.

[Kwasniewski] I frankly admit that whenever a new candidate is named, I start thinking about whether I should run or not because there are so many of them; but speaking seriously, I think there are a number of candidates who may count on significant support. It must be Jacek Kuron, or Adam Strzembosz, or Lech Walesa. This, I believe, is the group which will be... [changes thought] Oh, there will be a Polish Peasant Party [PSL] candidate because their decisions will only be taken in June. He may also be an interesting contestant in the run for the presidency. These are perhaps the main favorites.

[Correspondent] What did you think about President Lech Walesa's address in the Sejm?

[Kwasniewski] Well, it was a very specific misunderstanding. It was not the place for such an address. I understand President Lech Walesa's willingness to react to a number of issues, but it does not make any sense to stir new Polish-Polish arguments and wars to mark the anniversary of the end of the war. I believe that if his address in the Sejm were, more or less, in the spirit and philosophy of what he said in Pilsudski Square before the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, it would be proper, since this was an homage to the victims, this was a message of war, the struggle for peace and reconciliation, a search for something that joins, not divides, remembering the entire history, including the Stalinist history and history of crimes against Poles committed by the Soviet Union. Obviously these things should not be erased. Those protests that could be heard from the hall did not concern the issues of history; they concerned such provocations in the president's address as when he said that once again, this Sejm did not discuss the issue of Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy's trip to Moscow and that by not doing so, it showed that it was not representative of the nation. Such things should not be said when you are in parliament. A minimum of respect is needed to admit full democracy and representation of this group, because this is a fact. [passage omitted]

Poll: Kwasniewski, Kuron Top List of Candidates

WS1505113395 Warsaw GAZETA SWIATECZNA in Polish 13-14 May 95 p 2

[Article by KNYSZ: "Demoskop: Kwasniewski Slightly Ahead of Kuron"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently we published the Pentor poll (GAZETA WYBORCZA No. 98), according to which Jacek Kuron was slightly ahead of Aleksander Kwasniewski. Today we have presented results of Demoskop research for 11 April. This time the leader of the Democratic Left Alliance is slightly ahead of the Freedom Union leader. They also indicate that Kuron is the best known candidate for president. Three in four Poles know that he is already an official candidate. The candidacy of Adam Strzembosz is mentioned by 51 percent, Lech Walesa by 30 percent, and Kwasniewski by 22 percent.

Who for President?

	Percent
Aleksander Kwasniewski	25
Jacek Kuron	23
Adam Strzembosz	11
Lech Walesa	10
Tadeusz Zielinski	5
Andrzej Olechowski	4
Jozef Oleksy	3
Hanna Suchocka	3
Leszek Balcerowicz	2
Waldemar Pawlak	1
Someone else	13

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Daily on Walesa Strategy To Gain ZChN Support

WS1505080195 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 12 May 95 p 3

[Article by Wojciech Zaluska: "Will the President Manage To Gain Czarnecki's Support; Tempting the ZChN"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is no doubt: The nomination of Marek Jurek as chairman of the National Council of Radio and Television [KRRiT] is an element of Lech Walesa's battle for the presidency.

The president wants to obtain the support of the Catholic and anticommunist electorate. He is competing with Professor Adam Strzembosz for these votes. Judging by the results of public opinion polls, his position is slightly worse right now. Strzembosz is supported by part of the church hierarchy, as well as by the bloc of five rightist parties (the Center Accord, Conservative Coalition, Peasant Accord, Peasant-Christian Party, and the Conservative Party). He has just started making efforts to gain the support of the Christian-National Union [ZChN] and "Solidarity" ["S"].

Walesa wants to stop him. He has begun with a fight for ZChN. His tactics are as follows: Support in return for offices. As recently as a few months ago he appointed ZChN member Henryk Goryszewski to the post of the National Security Office head. However, Goryszewski's supporters were defeated at the party's congress in March. It was a success for "Walesa-skeptics"—the factions of Ryszard Czarnecki and Marek Jurek.

To obtain the support of ZChN, the president had to win at least one of those factions over to his side. He chose Jurek, and the choice was by no means accidental. In the winning camp it is this faction that treats Strzembosz with the greatest reserve. The "Jurek supporters" suspect the professor of promoting conservative-liberal parties. They themselves represent a different philosophy—the national one.

If they go over to the president's side, the entire ZChN will have to follow suit. Other groupings, which are rather hesitant today, may follow in their footsteps. Including part of "S."

Two rightist blocs will then stand against each other in the presidential campaign. Walesa (as the commemoration of World War II showed) will take on the role of defender of the faith and Polish interests. He will try to persuade voters that these values are in jeopardy. Marek Jurek may be of help to him in this undertaking. He will not be a sufficient counterbalance to the coalition representatives in KRRiT, but he will cause spectacular conflicts. These will further aggravate the divisions among Polish people, which Walesa wants to see happening.

Former SB Officer Appointed Oleksy's Adviser

WS1505113895 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 15 May 95 p 1

[Article by Piotr Smilowicz: "SB as an Adviser to Oleksy"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Andrzej Anklewicz, former officer of the Security Service [SB], has been appointed head of the prime minister's advisory team. "He could work in the Internal Affairs Ministry, but he should not hold a political office," says Krzysztof Kozlowski, former head of the ministry, who verified his past and provided positive results. "I can see no circumstances under which Anklewicz would be responsible for anything," the head of the Office of the Council of Ministers stated.

[Passage omitted] Andrzej Anklewicz was an SB officer in the 1970's and the 1980's. He worked in the Third Department of the Internal Affairs Ministry [MSW] (combating political opposition), among other places; he was also the ministry's "liaison" with the Central Committee of the United Polish Workers' Party and the Sejm.

In 1990 Anklewicz was positively verified and obtained a job in MSW. [passage omitted]

Anklewicz is the head of the still incomplete advisory team. It is known that the team will also include Andrzej Drawicz, a Russian philologist, former activist of "Solidarity," head of the Radio and Television Committee in the Tadeusz Mazowiecki government. He will not receive any remuneration and will be Oleksy's adviser on Eastern affairs.

Indictment of Oleksy Not To Be Pursued

LD1205120795 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1005 GMT 12 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Leszek Spalinski, the presidential press spokesman, has said that given the present situation in parliament, a resolution to indict the prime minister before the Tribunal of State will not be presented. The spokesman said the Belweder Palace lawyers are preparing a reply to the letter from Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy on the issue of the countersignature, that is the prime minister's signature, under the nomination of Christian-National Union [ZChN] Deputy Chairman Marek Jurek to the post of chairman of the National Radio and Television Broadcasting Council [KRRiTV].

[Begin Spalinski recording] I judge that these matters have not yet been fully clarified, and the prime minister's reaction, if only on this issue of the seeking of a

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countersignature to the appointment of Mr. Marek Jurek to the post of KRRiTV chairman, is something that I take as a kind of emotional reaction to what has taken place in association with the Moscow trip.

Without going into legal details, the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Administrative Court in 1994 ruled that on the issue of the appointment of members of the KRRiTV the president has so-called extraconstitutional entitlements. The (?effectiveness) of the president's actions is decided by the law on radio and television broadcasting. The president's stance has not changed on this matter. The president feels that the prime minister has, quite simply, behaved incorrectly, has violated the Constitution by going to Moscow without the consent of the head of state. For understandable reasons, there will be no further formal and legal consequences of this, since the present parliament would reject such a resolution from the president. [end recording]

New KRRiT Head Interviewed on Walesa, Support

WS1205133895 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 12 May 95 p 2

[Interview with Marek Jurek, newly appointed chairman of the National Council of Radio and Television, by Rafal Szubstarski and Igor Zalewski; place and date not given: "The Council Should Defend Television's Independence"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [ZYCIE WARSZAWY] You were seen as leader of the anti-Walesa faction in the Christian-National Union [ZChN]. Why did you decide o accep" the president's offer?

[Jurek] ZChN's attitude toward the president is quite complex. We gave him definite support in the previous elections, but later on many of his decisions disappointed us. Now the president has made an important gesture toward people sharing my views. The issue of the media is extremely important from the social point of view, and one's decision cannot be determined on one's sympathies or antipathies. This holds especially true in a situation when we increasingly often hear about activities aimed at turning mass media into an instrument, to eliminate certain values from them.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Has Lech Walesa been credible to you in his anticommunist campaign in recent months?

[Jurek] It can be expected that Lech Walesa has finally realized the seriousness of the communist threat and that he will firmly respond to it. On the other hand, his activities can be interpreted as an election game. Regardless of any evaluations, I decided that I could not reject the president's offer.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Your nomination as head of the National Council of Radio and Television [KRRiT] is seen as the president's attempt to gain the support of ZChN before the presidential elections.

[Jurek] I have gotten rid of the burden of the dilemmas which ZChN is facing right now. I remember, however, that our stand on Lech Walesa was always been characterized by two elements: a critical attitude on the one hand, and loyalty on the other.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] It seems that loyalty is beginning to take precedence over the critical attitude. The president is surrounding himself with an increasing number of people linked to ZChN.

[Jurek] My colleagues have morally exempted me from the duty of being ZChN chairman.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Your colleagues will, however, have to make a choice soon—whether to support either Lech Walesa or Adam Strzembosz.

[Jurek] If the president reaches out his hand, we cannot push it away, which does not mean that ZChN determines its stand on Lech Walesa's personnel decisions. The thing that is most important is the ideological attitude of the candidates. For example, the president's last speech in the Sejm, on the 50th anniversary of World War II's end, was in line with ZChN's stand.

However, even more important is the issue of prospects, credibility. The ZChN leadership must assess whether Lech Walesa's policy is credible, whether he will continue it after the elections.

My colleagues should also remember that their favorite must be effective. Therefore, they should closely follow which rightist candidate will be in a position to defeat the communists.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Your candidacy was discussed at a meeting of the party's leadership. You obtained their support. What is ZChN expecting of KRRiT?

[Jurek] One might ask the question differently: Why are media so important to us. They have become the fourth power. They are shaping moral, social, and political concepts which are then copied in people's behavior. Of all the factors that affect the development of social life, the atmosphere in the media may be the most important.

Of course, in a free society media must continue to be free. However, public media must be subject to certain formal evaluation—whether they are fulfilling their social role well enough. This is the role that KRRiT is playing.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What is your evaluation of public television?

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[Jurek] I was very critical of the television which emerged in the early period of the independent Poland. Now the situation is much better. The television broadcasts a number of programs that serve the purpose of elucidating the dilemmas of the people who influence the fate of the country. I am now referring to such broadcasts as "Leviathan," "Pulse of the Day," "VIP," and a similar program broadcast by the Second Channel in the morning. They play the role of a link between public life and the people. This is very valuable, but despite that, it causes great dissatisfaction and attacks. This is why KRRiT must defend the independence of public television.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Is the Christian philosophy sufficiently represented in the public media?

[Jurek] This philosophy must have its place—this is a condition of pluralism, and it must be respected. That is all.

Now, many people with leftist views believe that the very presence of rightist, Catholic opinions on television is a strange thing. [passage omitted]

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PAC Head Not To Run for President

AU1505113295 Bucharest COTIDIANUL in Romanian 8 May 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Nicolae Manolescu, president of the Civic Alliance Party, by Tia Serbanescu; place and date not given: "The Image of the PAC After the Congress"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Serbanescu] Mr. Manolescu, has the [Civic Alliance Party] congress fulfilled your expectations?

[Manolescu] To a great extent it has. This means that we achieved the endorsement of a much clearer civic and neoliberal program and a much more operational statute. Moreover, the congress created a certain image of the Civic Alliance Party [PAC], that is, of understanding and cooperation, and not an aggressive image of conflict and disparity, as it could have happened after the withdrawal from the Democratic Convention.

[Serbanescu] What is the significance of Nicolae Taranu's election to the position of executive president?

[Manolescu] I proposed Taranu for that office. First, for reasons connected with the volume of work in the party, but also for reasons of protocol, to represent the party in various actions, because I could no longer cope alone. And it happened that not being able to be in two places at the same time, one could hear such things said at one meeting or another as "the PAC did not display a high level attendance" or was absent.

[Serbanescu] People were expecting PAC to propose its own presidential candidate and that this person would be Nicolae Manolescu. How did you resist the temptation?

[Manolescu] I stopped discussions on this issue for two reasons: First, it is too early to propose a candidate now, to put him out in the sun for one and a half years, and then be surprised that he dries up.

[Serbanescu] Are you referring to the sun... or to Captain Soare [meaning sun, involved in a corruption scandal]?

[Manolescu] I am referring to the real sun. And second, it is not appropriate that a party that hardly emerged from two alliances should immediately come up with a candidate. The idea that a candidate is pulling the party after himself is debatable. But it is certain that a badly organized party can pull everything downward. I want to see how this party operates alone, at least for a couple of months, and then we can see whether we can allow ourselves to have a presidential candidate. As far as I am concerned, I do not aspire to this position, especially since we are going to enter an absolutely ridiculous presidential campaign, in which the final battle will not be waged between two candidates but between two completely different structures: One that controls everything and the other that has no possibility whatever of stopping this control.

[Serbanescu] How can one get out of this vicious circle?

[Manolescu] The only solution is a parliamentary one. If one could win the parliamentary elections, one could also count in the future on an opposition candidate having a chance.

[Serbanescu] Upon your return from Alba Iulia [where the National Conference was held], the PAC's column of cars was involved in a traffic accident. Do you think that this accident might raise some suspicion?

[Manolescu] Not in the least. It was an accident in the true sense of the word and it was the fault of two young people riding motorbikes. They simply got in between the police car that was leading the column and the first car following it. They crossed at the junction without making sure that the road was clear and without having their lights on. One of them was taken to the emergency hospital with contusions. Thus, this accident has no political significance whatsoever, there is no doubt about it, not in the least.

Poll: 62 Percent Approve of Antonescu

AU1105142295 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 9 May 95 p 2

[Unattributed report: "An IRSOP Poll Clearly Shows 62 Percent of Romanians Have a Good Opinion of Marshal Antonescu"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The results of an extremely interesting IRSOP [Romanian Public Opinion Polling Institute] poll were presented last night on national television. The results are as follows:

1. Should today's Germany still be held guilty for triggering World War II?

	Percent
Yes	12
No	84
Do not know	4

2. Is Romania still in Russia's sphere of influence?

	Percent
Yes	41
No	47
Do not know	12

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3. If Romania were occupied, would the Americans come to our rescue?

	Percent
Yes	28
No	60
Do not know	12

4. What is your current opinion about:

	Good	Bad	Do Not Know
A. Hitler	2	90	8
W. Churchill	26	38	36
F. Roosevelt	31	31	38
B. Mussolini	5	68	27
I.V. Stalin	5	87	8
I. Antonescu	62	24	
14			

5. Do you think World War III could break out in Europe?

	Percent
Yes	53
No	41
Do not know	6

	Percent
Yes	67
No	24
Do not know	9

7. To which countries should Romania tighten its ties in the future?

	Percent
United States	29
France	18
Germany	17
Hungary	10
Japan	4
Moldova	4
Other	18

9. Is it possible that all World War II conflict parties should make up completely?

	Percent
Yes	56
No	44

The polled sample consisted of 1,198 individuals. Error margin: plus or minus 2.8 percent.

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Izetbegovic Not To Prevent UN Troop Pullout

BR1205144095 Paris LE MONDE in French 12 May 95 p 3

[Report by Afsane Bassir: "Bosnian President 'Will Not Stop' UN Withdrawal"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In a letter addressed to French Ambassador to the United Nations Jean Bernard Merimee, who is currently president of the Security Council, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic said that he "would not prevent" a withdrawal of the Blue Helmets. "To all the countries who are threatening us with pulling out, we say quite simply: We will not stop you," Mr. Izetbegovic wrote in the text that was made public on Wednesday, 10 May in New York.

Stressing that the status quo had become "absolutely intolerable" for his government, the Bosnian president called for a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the role of the Blue Helmets in Bosnia. [passage omitted]

Silajdzic: UN Helping To Alter Ethnic Map

AU1205165095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 12 May 95

[Report by Senada Cumurovic on news conference held by Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic and Ministers Hasan Muratovic and Muharem Sero in Sarajevo on 12 May—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Cumurovic] Prime Minister Silajdzic at the start of the news conference stressed that he wished to draw attention to the completely incomprehensible behavior of UN forces in Bosnia and Croatia. He later said that he believed that the UN was collaborating in the genocide, and proceeded to explain his claims:

[Silajdzic] We have reliable information that the UN Civilian Police [UNCIVPOL] and UN Monitors [UNMO] in Croatia are encouraging the Serbs from western Slavonia to cross into Bosnia-Herzegovina. I am afraid that past experience has taught us that this is a scenario which will not stop at 9,945 people, which is the number of people that have crossed into Bosnia so far. The UNCIVPOL and UNMO are encouraging Serbs from Slavonia to cross into Bosnia, and the Croatian UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR], or rather, UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia is helping with the transfer. These refugees, Serbs from Slavonia, are moving into Bosnian and Croat houses in areas that have been forcefully occupied by the aggressor. Therefore, the ethnic and demographic picture in Bosnia-Herzegovina is completely changing. Armed and uniformed men are currently being accommodated in refugee camps. This is, of course, against the UN Charter, against all UN regulations, and finally, I believe that this is a case of collaboration in genocide.

[Cumurovic] Is the changing of the Bosnian demographic picture with the help of the United Nations—which is currently being carried out—the beginning of a scenario that has been created somewhere else? This is the question which Silajdzic primarily asked the international community, which from our point of view—he said—did not have any success in the area, yet from the point of view of those who are creating international policy, it has been successful, because it has managed to contain the conflict within Bosnia-Herzegovina. He added:

[Silajdzic] The aggressor has been helped first with the arms embargo for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and second, with the maintenance of the status quo, and it is now clear that we are facing the final phase of this project and the changing of Bosnia's demographic and geographic maps.

[Cumurovic] The other topic which Prime Minister Silajdzic also addressed is the situation in Sarajevo and other protected areas. Namely, the only instrument that can stop the aggression is NATO, but the United Nations does not want to call them to intervene, Silajdzic said, and stressed that an air drop operation should be established for Bihac because there is no food there, and added that the aggressor was obstructing the medical evacuation from Gorazde of two young men whose lives directly depend on speedy evacuation.

[Silajdzic] If we link all that is happening in Bosnia with events in Croatia, we can conclude that the international community has decided to finish the job, the project, to the aggressor's advantage.

[Cumurovic] The general situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina implies the necessity of lifting the arms embargo for the Bosnian Government. Namely, six months ago, President Izetbegovic in the United Nations accepted the postponement of lifting the arms embargo thus enabling the aggressor to sign the peace plan in the meantime.

[Silajdzic] However, nothing happened and I believe that it is time for us to tell the world that we are demanding the lifting of the arms embargo; it is our right to tell friendly governments—like the United States Government, which is unsuccessfully urging NATO air strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina—that if they cannot accomplish anything in this regard because it depends on someone else, they can at least do something that depends solely on them, and that is to lift the arms embargo unilaterally.

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[Cumurovic] At today's press conference, Minister Hasan Muratovic clarified the situation regarding Sarajevo airport—which UNPROFOR has been keeping closed for weeks now because the Serbian aggressor opposes it—and said that there was only one way of opening the airport...

[Muratovic] ...that being that the United Nations should declare the airport open from such and such a date when the airlift would be reestablished. This means that NATO and the United Nations would protect the airport and the aircraft which bring humanitarian aid to the city.

[Cumurovic] Instead, UNPROFOR is unsuccessfully negotiating with the Pale Serbs, Minister Muratovic concluded.

Karadzic: 'We Will Gain Part of Neretva Valley'

LD1505090395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0804 GMT 15 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Nevesinje, 15 May (SRNA)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, has said that the Serbs will gain part of the Neretva Valley politically or militarily.

In the course of talks he held yesterday in Nevesinje with representatives of the occupied Serb municipalities of Mostar, Konjic, Stolac, and Capljina, Radovan Karadzic said that "the Neretva Valley is of strategic interest to the Serb Republic" and "we are duty-bound in this respect by the 45,000 Serbs who lived in this area before the war."

"Neither this nor any other part of Serb territory will be sold out, despite rumors to the opposite effect," President Karadzic said. He reiterated "that the Serb Republic will never accept the contact group's plans."

Members of the top state and political leadership of the Serb Republic yesterday ended their two-day tour of the municipalities of Serb Herzegovina. Nevesinje was the last point on their itinerary.

Third Anniversary of HVO Unit Celebrated

95BA0232C Mostar HRVATSKI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 14 Apr 95 p 7

[Article by Zeljka Mihaljevic: "We Will Celebrate Our Fourth Anniversary in Bugojno"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Major Vinko Zuljevic-Klica spoke about the combat history of the battalion, which is now part of the 22d Sabotage Unit of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council]. The audience was addressed by General Ivan Andabak, HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] Vice President Bozo Raic, Brigadier Ante Cutlak, Captain Neno Djogas, and Ivan Miletic, president of the Bugojno OV [Municipal Council].*

On 10 April in Livno there was a formal celebration of the third anniversary of the Ravens Battalion from Bugojno, which, as a special-purpose unit, is part of the 22d Sabotage Unit of the HVO. The members of the battalion, numerous relatives, friends, and fellow soldiers attended a holy mass in memory of the Ravens' dead in the Church of All Saints, after which they were honored with a minute of silence by a formal formation. The Ravens' commander, Major Vinko "Klica" Zuljevic, then introduced the battalion, stating a brief chronology of events from its very beginnings to the present day.

How the "Ravens" Arose

The Ravens were born on 10 April 1992, and the initial nucleus consisted of four or five fighters, including Commander Zuljevic, who fought in the Croatian Army, and afterwards dedicated themselves to the defense of the Bugojno municipality, because, as he said, they knew that they would also have a war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the beginning, in addition to them, 30 young men also applied; they succeeded in training and arming them through various private channels, and then devoted themselves to training people in the village of Kandija. After only 15 days or so, however, they were warned by local residents that people knew about them and that they were afraid that the village would be subjected to strong shelling. They therefore moved to the abandoned village of Okolisce, where they began intensive training with weapons and instruments, and they acquired their first cannons thanks to people in Croatia, especially Captain Neno Djogas. Volunteers from neighboring villages and Bugojno itself showed up very soon, and in just 10 days or so the battalion consisted of 1,500 people. They worked hard for entire days, and sometimes for 24 hours without rest. The village soon became too crowded for so many people, and so they began to leave for neighboring villages and the city, where they stayed in a motel and an elementary school.

The first baptism by fire was in the battles around Kasic's house and Ceribasic, where several young men were wounded, and then new battles and actions followed for Cipuljic, Zijamat, and then conflicts with the MOS [Muslim Defense Forces] on the Uskoplje-Ram battlefield, where in Uskoplje the first of the Ravens' commanders and the first of its warriors died, Darko Ljubas-Sljivo. Then came actions at Risovac, Mala Suljaga, Prusac, Garacki Podovi, Luzana, Hrasnica, Mostar, Komusine, and Jajce... in general throughout the entire territory of the Croatian republic of

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Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Ravens were also in the forefront in the liberation of Kupres, when upon entering the village of Duvnjake, the commander himself, Vinko "Klica" Zuljevic, was wounded, and lost a leg. On that occasion command of the Ravens was assumed by Slaven Petricevic, under whose leadership the Ravens were involved in the operations to liberate parts of the Livanj municipality from Serbian occupation. In all those battles, the Ravens lost 22 men, and every member of the battalion was wounded at least once, and some of them two or three times.

In a conversation with Commander Zuljevic, we learned that they were summoned to every front line where there was trouble, and people were braver and more decisive when the Ravens were next to them, even if there were only 10 men or so, because they were well-known, tough fighters, who rarely lost a battle.

The way in which the Ravens were addressed by numerous guests at the third anniversary celebration is therefore not surprising at all, and General Ivan Andabak said, "Men, I thank you for everything you have done so far, and especially today, which is the day of your establishment, headed by your commander Vinko 'Klica' Zuljevic.... I also thank you for your gallant struggle, because I participated directly with you in the Zima-Cincar operation to liberate Kupres, in which you contributed a great deal." General Andabak conveyed congratulations to the soldiers from Mladen Naletilic-Tuta, who could not come to the ceremony, saying that he was extremely proud to be with them.

Even earlier, we learned from a conversation with the Ravens' commander that at one time their battalion was out of favor with the Bugojno headquarters, which even partly disbanded it, and then, thanks to Generals Andabak and Tuta, things took a turn for the better, and they were finally recognized.

Perhaps those critical moments were also the reason why Bozo Raic, vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ, addressed those present with these words:

You Went Where It Was Most Difficult and Most Urgent

"Croatian soldiers, with the pleasant name of Ravens, I greet you on behalf of the president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ and I congratulate you on your third anniversary. Three years would not be a lot if they were years of peace, but your three years of bloody warfare deserve profound respect. Although the entire army of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a volunteer one, you are volunteers plus, because you, among all the others, always said, 'We are going where it is most difficult and most urgent.' And that is why it happens that you, your unit, and some others like you, and some of our people in politics are called hard-line. We do not have to be ashamed of that epithet—we are hard-line in terms of the way in which we understand Croatian national rights as a whole and how they should be resolved in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Your friends, whose pictures we see here with pain, and the thousands of Croatian soldiers who died in this war, obligate all of us, and you, to persist in the struggle until the final goal established by our HDZ—that is the freedom, sovereignty, and complete independence of the Croatian people in this region. I am obliged to say here that the struggle is not over, the war has not been brought to an end, and the solutions that we want have not yet been achieved."

The audience was also addressed by Croatian Army officers, Brigadier Ante Catlak and Captain Neno Djogas, as well as president of the Bugojno Municipal Council Ivan Miletic, who expressed his gratitude along with due respect and recollection of the memories of the dead members of the Ravens Battalion, expressing the hope that the fourth anniversary of the foundation of the battalion would be celebrated in Bugojno.

During the celebration, a congratulatory telegram arrived from the president and chief secretary of the Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ, Dario Kordic and Pero Markovic, which said, among other things: "You have shown how honorable and dignified it is to be a Croatian defender, in spite of all the difficulties, and you are the pride and joy of our Croatian people, and on this occasion we sincerely thank you."

The Ministry of Defense of the Croatian republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina awarded 15 ranks to members of the Ravens for exceptional dedication and contributions in the defense of Croatian territories, and six ranks posthumously, and 10 of the more prominent Ravens received revolvers.

[Box, p 7]

The Deceased Members of the Ravens

1. Darko Ljubas Sljivo
2. Slavko Skegro
3. Nikica Dilber Ciko
4. Mladen Milicevic
5. Vinko Mikulic
6. Frano Franjic
7. Vinko Sapina Cipica

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8. Miro Kasalo Brice
9. Ante Batinic Macak
10. Zdenko Piplica Gare
11. Niko Milardic
12. Mladen Dadic
13. Vinko Brajkovic Aljo
14. Dragutin Zivko
15. Ivica Sakic Pita
16. Mirko Zivko Cica
17. Ante Zivko Cica
18. Ivo Batinic Uscipak
19. Stipan Glavas Pipan
20. Mario Dadic
21. Mijo Vucak Mica
22. Miroslav Telenta

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Defense Ministry Denies Blockade of UN Troops

LD1205145695 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 12 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The political department of the Ministry of Defense issued a communique in connection with a statement made by the UNCRO [United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia] representative General Kotil yesterday:

After the signing of the Zagreb Agreement [between Croatia and the Croatian Serbs] and the withdrawal of the Croatian army from the separation zone, rebel Serbs from the temporarily occupied areas were constantly deployed in the separation zone and at [UN] observation posts, to which UNCRO did not react at all and took no action.

After the rebel Serbs deployed their artillery along the front line, units of the Croatian army were forced to take up positions in the separation zone for security reasons. Following intervention by international representatives and negotiations with the Serb rebels, units of the Croatian Army unilaterally and unconditionally withdrew from most of the points they occupied in the separation zone. Immediately after the withdrawal of the Croatian Army Forces, rebel Serbs occupied some observation posts which the Croatian Army members left.

In addition, by laying mines they blocked the supply of UNCRO bases from the Serb side. UNCRO demanded that the logistical support and supply of its troops should be carried out from the Croatian side, which was immediately accepted; since 1 May logistical support has been provided on a regular basis.

During the most intense rebel Serb attacks on UNCRO observation posts its members were protected by the Croatian Army. In the period between 1600 on 3 May 1995 and 1800 on 11 May 1995 rebel Serbs violated the cease-fire 36 times: four times by opening fire from antiaircraft guns, once from hand-held rocket launchers, 19 times by mortar shells, three times by opening artillery fire, four times by tank fire, and seven times by carrying out infantry attacks. The Croatian Army did not retaliate to any of these; on each occasion it lodged a protest with UNCRO, the international observers, and the EU observers, who did not react.

Reports that the Croatian Army is opening sniper fire from [UN] observation posts on rebel Serb positions in the temporarily occupied area are also false. We must point out that rebel Serbs wounded an UNCRO member at about 1400 on 9 May this year.

All this time the Croatian Army has been helping UNCRO, regularly supplying it with food, drink, and medical supplies, which the Czech soldiers need because of the blockade imposed on them by the rebel Serbs.

The truth of this report can best be seen from our photographs, such as the ones showing the Serb rebels entering the zone of separation near Otocac and laying mines. It can clearly be seen who is entering the zone of separation.

The above facts are yet another proof of the misinformation of the public and the international community, with the purpose of showing that the Croatian Army has been violating the agreements signed.

This was today's statement for the public of the Defense Ministry's political department, signed by the department's chief Brigadier Ivan Tolj.

Official Views Situation in Western Slavonia

AU1205173995 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 10 May 95 p 7

[Interview with Ivica Kostovic, Croatian deputy prime minister, by Mirjana Priscan; place and date not given: "Repatriation Can Begin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It happened fast. The news, which came in rapid succession, made many Croatian people happy and inflicted great pain on some. Although not all of them still have their houses, thousands of refugees have their homes again, ever since Western Slavonija was liberated! At the same time, with their "Orkan" rockets, the criminals killed civilians in the center of Zagreb, and with murderous splinters ("zvoncici"), they wounded children, passersby, ballet dancers, commuters in tramcars.... They revenged themselves on Karlovac, Sunja, Novska, Lipik.... Last week will forever remain in the memory of Professor Doctor Ivica Kostovic. As a father, he will remember Wednesday afternoon, when his student daughter Mirna was heavily wounded at Mazuranica Square in Zagreb. As the deputy prime minister in the government, he will remember Tuesday afternoon when, as the main negotiator on the Croatian side, he tried to persuade the leaders of the armed Serbs in Pakrac to surrender....

[Priscan] What was the military situation in Western Slavonia on 2 May, when you started the negotiations with the leaders of armed Serbs in the Pakrac area?

[Kostovic] At that moment, in the area of Pakrac, there were over a thousand rebels from different units. They were surrounded, since the Pakrac-Okucani road was cut. From their strongholds, they were shelling civilian targets in Lipik and Pakrac with heavy weapons. During that attack, one person was killed in Lipik.

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We Asked for Immediate Surrender!

[Priscan] Where, with whom, and about what did you negotiate?

[Kostovic] My task was to deliver them the highest guarantees of the government and of President Tudjman, and to confirm what the head of police in Pakrac, Nikola Ivkanec, and our negotiators had already offered the rebels: That they would be treated according to the laws of Croatia if they handed over all their weapons. Civilians were guaranteed all civil and human rights, and soldiers who had not committed any war crimes or crimes against humanitarian law were offered amnesty according to our law.

I communicated the message of the government to the rebel Serbs through the commander of the Argentinian battalion of UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia], and I urgently asked their representatives to come to negotiate. We waited for the reply of the commander of the Pakrac rebel brigade, first in the police station in Pakrac, and then we went to the former UN troops post in Gavranica.

The rebel Serbs of Pakrac first answered that they could not surrender in such a short time and that they could give their reply only the following day. Then they attacked Pakrac. We waited nevertheless. At 1400 [1200 GMT], the Argentinians reported that the Serbs had agreed to negotiate. The development of the situation in Okucani had also influenced that.

We demanded immediate surrender! We had nothing to wait for, because the message of the Croatian Government was the maximum, but the rebels were obviously playing for time, waiting to see if anybody could help them militarily.

Six hundred rebels from the Pakrac Brigade were represented by their commander, Stevan Harambasic, and their civil "authorities" by Dzakula, Grozdanic, and Ivanovic. The other commanders were not ready to negotiate. In our negotiating team, there were the head of the political section [politicka uprava] of the Ministry of Defense, Brigadier Tolj, the deputy interior minister, Mr. Smiljan Reljic, and the head of the Pakrac police station, Nikola Ivkanec. The negotiations, which lasted several hours, were directly observed by the representatives of the military and civil sectors of UNCRO.

Instead of the Surrender of Arms—Attack

[Priscan] What went on in those several hours? Did the Serb negotiators present any conditions?

[Kostovic] Their demand was that they surrender to UNCRO, and even that not immediately but in 15 days. We demanded their immediate surrender. We told Harambasic that the military situation offered them no way out, and we stressed that they should at least save their men, and, in particular, protect the civilians. We warned him that he would bear huge responsibility if he rejected the protection Croatia offered them and all the rights the law granted them.

He left after we specified 1800 as the deadline for the handover of their weapons. The way in which this was to be performed was specified earlier, when Dzakula, Grozdanic, and Ivanovic came to negotiate. If they accepted our offer, we said, they were to considered as the citizens of Croatia. We pointed out, of course, that those who had committed crimes would have to stand trial.

They could not discuss it without their military structures, so they went away and came back with Commander Harambasic. Then we specified that all heavy arms were to be handed over before 1800 the following day, and that every day they would hand in 120 rifles, so that they would all be disarmed in five days. They were supposed to hand over the heavy arms to UNCRO. However, on the next day, they continued their attack on civilian targets in Pakrac with heavy arms, and, by doing so, they confirmed that they had not handed them over! They did not do so on 4 May either.

[Priscan] What was the attitude of the Serb negotiators?

[Kostovic] It seems to me that they were not afraid, nor were they prepared to accept the offer of the Croatian authorities. They asked that all civilians leave that area, but that would have meant that the armed ones would go on fighting! And, after they surrendered, we found tens of trucks full of weapons. I replied that every civilian who had documents would be able to leave as a Croatian citizen—if they wanted to, of their own free will, but that the interest of Croatia was that the civilians should remain.

Both Local and Imported Chetniks

[Priscan] Did you sign anything or was it only an oral agreement?

[Kostovic] The first part of the negotiations was oral, and I guaranteed in writing—on the condition that they would surrender—all civil rights, both to the commanders and to the civilians. Then, on the local level, the negotiators signed an agreement on a possible evacuation. The Serb paramilitary formations were offered the chance to leave the Pakrac area with their personal weapons. However, the extremists among the rebels, despite everything, proceeded with the military action.

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[Prscina] Because of those extremists, the rebels did not comply with the agreement on the surrender of weapons?

[Kostovic] Yes. The most dangerous ones were those, more than 500, members of paramilitary forces from different special militias, and from Knin. Most of them surrendered only after they were forced to do so by our police.

[Prscina] Who was it actually that held the area of Pakrac under occupation—local or imported Chetniks?

[Kostovic] Not only local ones. We will still have to wait a while for this to be fully established, but among those who were forced to surrender by the military action of our police, there were the Pakrac Brigade, the Daruvar Squad, and the Slatina Squad, some units of special militias from other occupied parts of Croatia, as well as from Bosnia, who had been trained by professionals from Nis [in Serbia].

[Prscina] Exactly how many Serb civilians remained, and how many fled from the Western Slavonija region after the action by the police forces?

[Kostovic] Around 5,000 people from Jasenovac, Stara Gradiska, and Okucani left the territory of Croatia, and are now in Bosnia. The rebel army ordered them to withdraw, they were forced to leave. As for the area of Pakrac, where their troops were forced to surrender, women, children, and old people were granted full protection by our police and humanitarian organizations. So far, the Red Cross of Croatia has registered 2,197 persons—in the villages of Bjelanovac, Kovacevac, Caglic Gornji, Caglic Donji, Bukovcani, Skenderovci Caglicki, Seovica, Japaga, Lipovac Kusonjski, Brusnik, Sumetlica Gornja, Sumetlica Donja, Kricke, as well as in a part of the town of Pakrac.

All Serb households are well preserved, unlike Croat ones. The population has been offered initial social aid, now they are about to receive pensions. However, the mistrust of the Serb population is great, because that has been warmed up for a long time through intimidations by rebel leaders.

There Is Nothing To Be Discussed With Martic

[Prscina] After the liberation of Western Slavonija, are the attitudes in other occupied parts as hopeless and horrible as the Martic's threats make them sound: That he will shell Zagreb with rockets, and kill 100,000 innocent people?

[Kostovic] We do not know how the rest of the rebels from the occupied territories will behave. The proficiency of the Croatian police and army is at the same time a guarantee that there will no major military incidents. Those who do not recognize such a respectable force, bear the responsibility. And with Martic, whose response is a threat that Zagreb will be shelled—with such a man there is really nothing to discuss.

[Prscina] According to the data published so far, at least one third of over the 1,000 Serbs from Pakrac that surrendered have already been released. Which of them can appeal to the Amnesty Law?

[Kostovic] More than 1,000 Serbs from Pakrac were captured, and more than 500 have been released. Those who are released do not need the Amnesty Law. They were proved not to have been members of formations. The members of armed formations who are proved not to have committed any crimes can appeal for amnesty.

[Priscan] How wil prisoners who were armed and are members of other states be treated?

[Kostovic] Foreign mercenaries or volunteers are prisoners of war proper. What awaits them is prison and trial. They are a foreign force that attacked Croatian territory. There is a law on the protection of the Croatian constitutional system, and in accordance with that, hundreds of people have already been sentenced, some of them in absentia, like Martic. Such prisoners are treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

Repatriation With the Help of the State

[Priscan] According to the data of the governmental bureau for refugees and exiled persons, after the liberation of Western Slavonia, at least 14,000 exiled persons are waiting to be able to return home. To what extent has the first condition for the repatriation been fulfilled—their safety?

[Kostovic] After Zagreb was shelled, nobody can be safe anywhere. That is why it is logical that life should return to the liberated areas. As far as safety is concerned, there is no difference between Zupanja, Rajevo Selo, and the areas that have now been liberated. Authority has been established, Croatian troops supervise [nadziru] the border, the area is now protected from the incursion of stronger formations from across the Sava River [border with Bosnia]. And the Bosnian Serbs cannot afford an aggression against another state so easily, no matter how much Karadzic may brag about it!

[Priscan] The exiled people are waiting; what is the state doing to prepare their return?

[Kostovic] The return should be gradual. The government is doing the most important now: It is reconstructing the infrastructure, from telephone to traffic connections, they are opening post offices, banks, health and veterinary stations, and so on.

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[Priscan] How will the houses and the economy be reconstructed?

[Kostovic] Croat villages in the recently liberated Western Slavonija territory—Gornji Bogicevici and Donji Bogicevici, as well as Croatian houses in Jasenovac—were badly destroyed. The time that the Ministry of Reconstruction will need to newly erect and to reconstruct those houses—three to six months—is how long the people who had been exiled from those places will have to wait before they return.

Those whose houses are whole can return immediately. The infrastructure will be finished soon.

Nobody will return without state help. We have not foreseen any loans, but for the time being there is no need for them, since the Ministry of Reconstruction will reconstruct the houses, meaning they will build walls, roofs, windows, doors. The reconstruction of houses has already started in Gorice, a village in Brodsko-Posavska district [zupanija]. All that the exiled persons need to do is sign a contract with the Ministry of Reconstruction to say that they will return.

Those who want to will be able to sign the agreement and move into deserted Serb houses temporarily. And all exiled persons, once they return, will still have that status as well as the social help. The government will now decide whether that will last six months or longer.

[Box, p 7]

The Worst Serbian Propaganda

[Priscan] How much truth is there in the "news" that has been shown on foreign television stations, about "tens of thousands of dead civilians along the Zagreb-Lipovac highway after the action by the Croatian police forces"?

[Kostovic] That is the worst propaganda! You can remember Vukovar, when, instead of thousands of killed people, they reported children allegedly killed by Croats, which was later denied. The fact is that all civilians from the Pakrac area are protected and in their own houses, and there may only have been some casualties in the course of military operations.

Our units did not fire on civilian objects, and the police forces in particular were given orders to protect not only people, but property as well.

[Priscan] Do you think that the truth about the humane treatment of prisoners and civilians has spread into the world enough? Because, the UN Security Council, on the basis of uncertain information, accused Croatia!?

[Kostovic] It is a part of a systematical campaign, the intention of which is to exert pressure on Croatia and to prepare the world public for even greater pressure on Croatia. The campaign is being conducted by certain interests of world powers. Which ones? Certainly not Germany and the United States! If UNCRO members were in the buses that were transporting the surrendered soldiers who, but a day earlier, had been shelling Pakrac, then every world television station first had to prove the source of information. No unofficial statements must be made in wartime. That was utterly irresponsible of the United Nations.

When you remember what the "Yugoslav Army" did in Vukovar in 1991, then our behavior in Western Slavonija was not only utterly professional; moreover, not many armies or countries would have behaved in that way.

The real truth is that the Serbs want to make up for the military loss by accusing Croatia of genocide, and that precisely on the territory of Pakrac, where the worst terrorist actions were recorded, where as many as 11 serious incidents occurred in the course of last year on the Pakrac-Pozega road. Another fact is that they took their revenge for the victory of the police forces in Western Slavonija by shelling Zagreb twice.

Opinion Poll Following Western Slavonija Action

AU1205181195

[FBIS Editorial Report] Zagreb Globus in Serbo-Croatian on 12 May on pages 8,9, and 55 carries an approximately 4,000-word report by Davor Butkovic on the popularity of Croatian politicians and political parties following the Croatian Army's military successes in Western Slavonia. The report is entitled "President Tudjman Has Received 59.5 Percent of the Votes, and Yet Tomislav Mercep Is Still Making Political Ultimatums."

According to the report, GLOBUS "carried out its special poll on 6 and 7 May after the action in western Slavonija, interviewing 1,000 people from all parts of Croatia."

The report also states that "only seven days earlier, two days before the liberation of western Slavonia, GLOBUS's research team had conducted a regular monthly opinion poll out in the field (which means that questions were answered personally, not over the telephone), interviewing 2,000 citizens of Croatia. The results were completely different."

The results of the poll are presented in several tables and expressed in percentages as follows:

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1. 30 April, a day before the operation in Slavonia: Which party would you vote for in the elections?

RIDS (Rijeka Democratic Alliance)	1.1
HKDU (Croatian Christian Democratic Union)	1.2
DA (Dalmatian Action)	1.3
Others	2.2
HNS (Croatian National Party)	3.1
IDS (Istrian Democratic Congress)	4.2
HND (Croatian Independent Democrats)	4.8
SDP (Social Democratic Party)	6.1
HSS (Croatian Peasants Party)	8
HSP (Croatian Party of Rights)	8.4
HSLS (Croatian Social Liberal Party)	27.3
HDZ (Croatian Democratic Community)	32.3

2. 8 May, five days after the operation in Slavonia: Which party would you vote for in the elections?

HND	1.6
IDS	3.1
Others	3.9
SDP	4.3
HSS	4.6
HSP	7.5
HSLS	26.9
HDZ	48.1

3. 30 April, a day before the operation in Slavonia: Who would you vote for to be president of the republic in the elections?

Franjo Tudjman (president)	36.5
Drazen Budisa (HSLS)	20.1
Zdravko Tomac (SDP)	7.2
Ante Djapic (HSP)	5.8
Others	5.1
Stipe Mesic (HND)	4.9
Mikica Valentic (prime minister)	4.7
Josip Pankretic	3.4
Franjo Greguric (former prime minister)	3.1
Mate Granic (foreign minister)	2.6

3. 30 April, a day before the operation in Slavonia: Who would you vote for to be president of the republic in the elections?

Ivica Racan (SDP)	2.5
Mladen Vedris	1.6
Janko Bobetko (former chief of Army Staff)	1.4
Ratomir Cacic (HNS)	1.1

4. 8 May, five days after the operation in Slavonia: Who would you vote for to be president of the republic in the elections?

Franjo Tudjman	59.5
Drazen Budisa	22
Others	5.8
Ante Djapic	4.3
Nikica Valentic	3.1
Zdravko Tomac	2.2
Mate Granic	1.8
Stipe Mesic	1.3

5. When do you think elections will be held?

When they are scheduled to be held	56.5
Before they are scheduled to be held	19.9
Do not know	23.6

6. Do you think the new peacekeeping forces (UNCRO) (UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia) will facilitate reintegration and the return of refugees, or should this be done by the Republic of Croatia itself according to the model of its action in Western Slavonia?

By Republic of Croatia	77.1
By UNCRO	8.9
Jointly by UNCRO and Republic of Croatia	1.4
Do not know	12.6

7. Do you approve of the action by the Croatian Army and police in Western Slavonia?

Yes	94.3
No	1.3
Do not know	4.4

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8. Do you think the action was executed well?	
Yes	89.1
Partly yes	5.5
No	0.5
Do not know	4.9

Further on UN Official on Croat-Serb Tension

LD1205221895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2203 GMT 12 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 12 (TANJUG)—U.N. peacekeeping forces representative here, Yuriy Chizhic, said Friday that tension still prevailed in all sectors under U.N. protection, following Croatia's aggression on Western Slavonia.

Tension is mounting in U.N.-protected Sector East. Hundreds of troops of both sides, deployed east of Osijek, are digging in heavy weapons, while there has been small arms and rifle grenade fire south of Osijek, Chizhik said at a press conference here.

Chizhik said the Croatian Army was still blocking U.N. forces posts in Sector South, and specified that 22 soldiers of the Czech battalion are closed in their shelter 15 kilometers northwest from Otocac, in Lika.

Artillery and mortar attacks around Gospic at key locations are ongoing, Chizhik added.

Although he said the situation in Sector West was stabilizing, Chizhik pointed to an increased number of Croatian military police east of Pakrac who are restricting and interfering in contacts of UNCIVPOL [UN Civilian Police] with the local Serb population.

Representatives of U.N. peacekeeping forces for civilian affairs, UNCIVPOL, and the U.N. center for human rights are again present in Sector West, where they are conducting, together with the Hague tribunal investigators, an inquiry into what happened last week during Croatia's offensive on Serb towns in the area.

Serb Krajina sources have said that more than 1,000 Serb civilians were killed in the Croatian Army attack on Western Slavonia launched on May 1, while 13,000 Serbs were forced to leave their homes. Croatian soldiers then opened fire from all weapons on the columns of Serb refugees, mostly women, children and old people who fled to avoid being massacred in their homes.

Chizhik said he was convinced the commission will carry out thorough investigations and determine the real consequences of the Croatian offensive and the truth about the events on the road from Okucani to Nova Gradiska.

There, refugees have said that Croatian soldiers carried out a massacre over Serb civilians.

Asked to comment reports that U.N. forces, Red Cross officials and the U.N. center for human rights have information from refugees that there are mass graves in western Slavonija, Chizhik said a thorough investigation would be conducted of all allegations which reach the U.N.

That is why UNCIVPOL posts need to be set up as soon as possible in Western Slavonia, Chizhik said.

Asked if official Zagreb has explained why Croatian forces barred access to Western Slavonia for several days to representatives of U.N. peacekeeping forces, Chizhik said that to his knowledge no specific explanation was given.

Chizhik said that 320 Serb civilians from Western Slavonia had crossed, in the past three days, the bridge on the Sava into the Bosnian Serb republic, and that another 300 people also wanted to do so.

Serbs Said To Have 'Lethal Chemical Weapons'

AU1505101695 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 12 May p 16

[Article by Emil Vidusic: "Karadzic and Martic Do Not Care About Conventions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently, as the world has celebrated the 50th anniversary of the end of one of the most horrible wars in the history of mankind, ominous threats of a new war have, since last Saturday, again overcast the horizon of eastern Slavonia. Encouraged by the approach of around 30 tanks to the eastern Danube bank, and the arrival of one motorized and mechanized division of the Yugoslav Army from Belgrade, the commander of the so-called Slavonia-Baranja Corps, General Loncar, ordered his army to take the heavy weapons out of several barracks in Baranja, and to position them near the separation line, facing the 3d Osijek Brigade of the Croatian Army.

At the same time, the war criminal Arkan started a new training in subversion and terrorism for Serbian paramilitary forces in Erdut, which further increased the tension in eastern Slavonia.

Therefore, regardless of Tudjman's convincing the West that Croatia is not planning any actions similar to those in Western Slavonia, Croatian citizens can by no means be indifferent to the thunder of war drums that can be

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heard to the north of the Drava and to the east of the Danube.

After each defeat Serbs always undertake counterattacks disproportionately bigger than the operations that preceded them, so one must expect that after this latest, radical defeat, they will act in the same, or in an even worse way. The recent statement from Momcilo Krajisnik, the president of Karadzic's "parliament," proves this; he said that the Serbs "will soon react to the Croatian attack on Western Slavonia much more severely."

More Terrible Than "Orkan" Missiles

The shameless twofold bombardment of the Croatian capital, and the alleged unfulfilled intention to bomb Osijek as well, is not the maximum amount of hatred with which the rebel Serbs are daily stuffed and intoxicated. Only their new terror can be worse than their present terror. Those who thought and said that the insane attack on Croatian towns in response to the action taken by Croatian police and army troops was the utmost impudence, must realize that in Martic's and Karadzic s factory of terror ideas have not dried up, nor has production ceased. After using cluster bombs, forbidden by international conventions, for retaliation against Zagreb, Martic blabbed that absolutely nothing would prevent his using other lethal weapons, which would hit the enemy where it hurt most.

The criminal pair, Martic and Karadzic, do not care for numerous international conventions that prohibit the use of inhumane weapons (can weapons be—humane?), and in their desperation they are capable of the worst; they would use chemical weapons any day, in order to impose chemical war on Croatia, with consequences more horrifying than those the "Orkan" missiles had on Zagreb.

It is not known how many dangerous chemical weapons there are in the two paramilitary armies—Karadzic's army in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Martic's army in the Republic of Croatia. But what is known is the answer to the question where they got the weapons from.

The Technical Military Institute in Mostar was earlier one of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] suppliers of chemical weapons. Since the production of poisonous gas is prohibited, and the violation of those prohibitions calls for international, often military, sanctions (Libya, Iraq...), the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [SFRY], before the eyes of the world and the domestic public, officially produced only nonlethal ("school") poisonous gas and chemical weapons. However, lethal chemical weapons were also produced in Mostar. Another supplier of those weapons for the two paramilitary armies was the JNA, whose units, before their withdrawal from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, left a third of their poisonous gas supplies to the "armies" of the so-called Republic of Serb Krajina and the Serb Republic. From the factories in Krusevac, which allegedly have still produced six kilograms of non-lethal BZ and those in Lucani, which have produced 200 kg of CS, Milosevic and his generals—first Panic and later Perisic, in the meantime "refreshed" the reserves of General Mladic and General Celeketic, not only with the aforementioned but also with other "chemicals" for mass killing.

Eventually, bearing in mind the good relations Belgrade has had for many years with Tripoli and Baghdad (!!), intelligence experts are convinced that the two discredited Arab metropolises, known for the production of most dangerous kinds of chemical weapons, earlier sent "samples" of their technological achievements to the friendly army, so that Yugoslav experts could easily produce a substantial quantity of unknown poisonous gas, and secretly provide Mladic, and probably Celekovic, with smaller amounts.

Although Martic's aviation does not have convincing military potential, still, supported by Karadzic's airplanes and helicopters with containers of chemical weapons hooked onto them, one must not underestimate them, because only one, short attack on one Croatian town might provoke long-lasting, severe consequences.

Croatian Counterattack

Serbs put 1.3 kg of sarin or 3.3 kg of luisit [luizit] into 122 mm caliber missiles, and they even put the long-lasting poisonous VX gas into 130 mm caliber missiles. Since the range of those cannons is over 20 km, many Croatian towns behind the separation line could become targets for Chetnik terrorist bombardments. Arkan's subversive troops must not be underestimated either, because they are bandits of the worst sort, capable of poisoning local sources of food and water with botulin toxin, a very efficient chemical weapon, for a fee of around 100 German marks. Such social scum would be capable of using various other combinations of fluorine, copper, quicksilver, and lead, from the "do it yourself" workshop, and carry out sabotage actions with unpredictable consequences.

In addition, if one thinks of various poisons of herbal and animal origin, it is easy to understand that these are dangerous weapons, which kill and paralyze just as well as any conventional weapon.

No matter how disquieting Croatia may find such threats, it must face them on its own. NATO will not help it, and the United Nations cannot help it. Therefore, in resisting the chemical war, if it comes

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to one, Croatia must put all its trust into its military and civil defense. Croatia will not respond to chemical warfare with further chemical warfare, because it is a signatory of the convention on the prohibition of such weapons. However, what its army will do in that case will for sure be a fierce counterattack, for which it will not need those weapons that are used to prolong hatred, nor will it need the kind of war that speeds up the dying—as one distinguished Croatian journalist recently wrote in his column.

Babic: Croatian Army Not Leaving Slavonia

LD1305203695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1950 GMT 13 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 13 May (TANJUG)—Milan Babic, foreign minister of the Republic of Serb Krajina told ISKRA that, via its foreign minister, Mate Granic, Croatia "is deceiving the world public by saying that the Croatian Army is withdrawing from Western Slavonia and the buffer zones."

"Minister Granic's statement to the effect that the Croatian Army is in Western Slavonia along the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina confirms that Croatia is continuing to violate the cease-fire agreement signed on 29 March 1994," Babic said. He explained that the border area of Stara Gradiska and Jasenovac is in a buffer zone defined by the cease-fire agreement.

"Croatia continues to deploy its special units in a wooded area near Pakrac. These units use dogs trained to hunt humans, and they are killing every Serb on the spot who has not volunteered to be deported to the concentration camps set up for Serbs by the Croatian Government," Babic said.

According to the Krajina foreign minister, apart from the camps where the men have been detained, there are also camps for the rest of the deported population in Varazdin, Krapina, Daruvar, Novska, and Nova Gradiska. Croatia has denied representatives of the international community access to these camps. The remaining Serb population in the Pakrac area is being held captive in the village of Seovica by the Croatian Army.

Babic stressed that "it is a total lie that some Serbs have returned home; the truth is that they are being moved from one camp to another."

Unless Croatia withdraws its police and military forces from the occupied area of Western Slavonia the entire peace process will be at stake, Babic said.

The Serb Army of Krajina will not enter the separation zone in sectors South, North, and East if the Croatian Army withdraws and they are retaken by UN forces, Babic said.

Croats Set Up New Concentration Camps for Serbs

LD1305143595 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1325 GMT 13 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 13 May (SRNA)—The Croats have set up new concentration camps in Nova Gradiska and Ivanic-Grad for Serbian civilians from Western Slavonia, reports the Krajina commission in charge of registering the numbers of killed, missing, or imprisoned Serbs.

According to the commission, over 1,800 imprisoned Serbian fighters are currently held in Croatian concentration camps. The UNHCR has so far confirmed the figure of 1,200 PoWs.

The Serbs, who have crossed over from Pakrac to the Serb Republic in the past few days with the mediation of the UNHCR, are saying that the Croatian authorities have begun the deportation of civilians detained in the village of Seovica, where the entire population from eight villages in the Okucani municipality and five in the Pakrac municipality have been detained in such a small space.

It is very difficult to establish the precise number of imprisoned Serbs after the massacre, but the agony, fear, and uncertainty of the people is continuing in the occupied territory of Western Slavonia, and of the POWs in concentration camps in Varazdin, Bjelovar, and Podravska Slatina.

Camps, Execution Sites Listed

LD1205162295 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1507 GMT 12 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 12 May (SRNA)—The Croatian authorities are committing unprecedented crimes against the remaining Serb people in Western Slavonia, according to the testimonies of the Serbs who arrived in the Serb Republic yesterday with help from the UNHCR.

They are saying that strong large police forces put away all the remaining Serbs, mainly civilians from the village of Rogoljski Bazen, in a camp in the village of Sehovica near Pakrac.

Detained in the camp are all the people from the following villages around Okucani: Benkovac, Trnakovac, Gornji Rogolj, Donji Rogolj, Bijela Stena, Caprinjci, Borane, and Ljestane, and also from the villages in the Pakrac municipality: Sumetlica, Brusnik, Kragulj, and Caklic.

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The refugees are saying that some traces of Croatian crimes still remain and that dozens of corpses of killed and mutilated Serbs can be found near the Ladjevac canal.

"The Ustashas are burning the corpses every day," said an old woman wishing to remain anonymous in order to protect the other members of her family who are detained in the Sehovica camp.

The Serb refugees from Western Slavonia are saying that there are 1,300 to 2,000 imprisoned Serb fighters in camps in Varazdin, Bjelovar, and Podravska Slatina and that one could only guess about their fate.

After the betrayal and the surrender of some members of the Krajina Serb army, the Croatian police forces started a "hunt" in the nearby woods and crags of Mt Psunj of those who refused to surrender. They are being put on "summary trials," the refugees said.

Serb Refugees Testify to Mount Psunj 'Manhunt'

AU1405202895 Knin Srpski Radio Krajina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 12 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the testimony of the Serbs who have come to the free territory of the Serb Republic from occupied Western Slavonia in the past couple of days. Croatian authorities established a concentration camp for the Serbs in the village of Sevovica, near Pakrac. Almost all the remaining inhabitants of eight villages of the Okucani municipality and four villages of the Pakrac municipality are detained in the camp. Serb refugees who fled the area say that particularly distressing events are taking place in the vicinity of the Ladjevacki channel, where Croatian Army soldiers work around the clock removing bodies of dead Serbs, incinerating them within earshot of the crime scene.

Furthermore, the Croatian police has launched an outright manhunt for the Serbs who are still hiding in the wooded areas on Mt. Psunj, killing most of them on sight.

Defense Committee Calls Situation 'Stable'

AU1205161595 Knin Srpski Radio Krajina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 11 May 95

[Report by Svjetlana Stambolija]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, the civilian and military authorities of this part of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] held a session of the Coordination Committee for Defense in Dvor na Uni. Svjetlana Stambolija has a report on that:

[Begin recording] The session focused on the political and security situation on the territory of the Dvor na Uni Municipal Assembly. The situation in the 33d Infantry Brigade theater of operations and in the Dvor na Uni Municipality was said to be stable. Soldiers and people are determined to defend and preserve the borders of the RSK. The session coordinated tasks regarding the mobilization of civil defense, protection of population and property, specified concrete tasks, and designated people to fulfill them. The session discussed economic and civilian life under the circumstances, and agreed to allocate a sufficient number of people to allow the normal functioning of the municipality. Additional funds were allocated for the needs of the municipality's people's defense—i.e., both economic and noneconomic agents were involved in its financing. Furthermore, it was decided that some members of the Defense Ministry join units of the 33d Dvor na Uni Infantry Brigade.

Some individuals did not close their cafes or restaurants, as was ordered, and some disregarded the imposed curfew. The local police department and military police were charged with enforcing those orders until further notice.

The session concluded that a collection of humanitarian aid for Western Slavonia refugees is under way in the Dvor na Uni area in an organized manner. The action included all humanitarian organizations and the entire population of the Dvor na Uni Municipality, and it is supported by the authorities, army, police, and other institutions.

The concluding statement said that there is a full unity of civilian structures, local commands of the RSK army, the police department, and the defense ministry on the territory of the Dvor na Uni, as if a high level of coordination and cooperation was achieved in the past period, which is a guaranteed that all tasks regarding the defense and civilian life in the Dvor na Uni Municipality will be fulfilled successfully, ends the statement of the Dvor na Uni Coordinating Committee for Defense. [sentence as heard] [end recording]

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Defense Minister Handziski Leaves for U.S.

LD1305153195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1340 GMT 13 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 13 May (TANJUG)—Blagoje Handziski, defense minister of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], left here for a return visit to the United States, it was announced in Skopje today.

During his visit to the Pentagon, Handziski will hold talks with his host, Secretary of Defense William Perry. He is also expected to hold a number of meetings with high-ranking representatives of the U.S. Department of Defense, the statement notes. Handziski will also to visit two U.S. Army military bases—Fort Monroe in Virginia, and Fort Bragg in North Carolina. The Macedonian minister will also meet State Department representatives and high-ranking UN officials.

In Macedonia, the visit is officially seen as a "new impetus in military cooperation, especially within the 'bridge with America' [most prema Americi] project."

After the memorandum on military cooperation, signed between FYROM and the United States last November, a U.S. military team of liaison experts has already been stationed in Skopje.

There are approximately 550 U.S. soldiers within the UN peacekeeping forces in FYROM, mostly along the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; their role is that of observers.

Ministry Bans Several Private TV Stations

AU1305140395 Skopje MIC News in English 12 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Macedonian Ministry of Communications has banned the work of several private television stations in Skopje, and according to the authorities of the Ministry, this action is expected to have a broader effect and apply also to television stations in the province.

The reason for this action, as it was stated, is the fact that not a single television station has received a working permit from the Ministry, but such a permit is not possible to be obtained because neither the law on radio-diffusion, nor the old law mentions the existence of private television stations. The reason is because at the time when it was passed (1973) such a possibility was not even thought of.

Yet, in the past couple of years, a number of private radio and television stations were opened in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], which were tolerated by the authorities.

Supreme Court Chairman, Justices Elected

95BA0230C Skopje VECER in Macedonian 13 Apr 95 p 3

[Article by "V.V.": "Chairman and 15 Justices Elected"]

[FBIS Translated Text] With the election of the chairman and 15 justices of the Supreme Court, which is the highest judicial instance in the nation, the Supreme Court becomes constituted according to the new constitution for the first time.

The chairman of the Supreme Court and the 15 justices of this, the Republic's highest court, were elected yesterday by the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. Via this, the nation's Supreme Court for the first time becomes structured in accordance with the new constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. The elected judges, whose mandate is of unlimited duration, were nominated by the Judicial Council of the Republic, which will soon have to deal with the remaining 9 vacancies in this highest judicial instance.

Dimitrie Dimiskovski was elected chief justice of the Supreme Court; Dr. Kiril Cavdar, Dimitar Uzunov, Agim Miftari, Pavel Manev, Vangel Gagacev, Dr. Fidanco Stoev, Konstantin Hadzi-Lega, Zedjir Selimi, Milojka Kalkaslieva, Vasil Petkovski, Milica Smickova, Ranko Maksimovski, Petar Golubovski, Blagorodna Dulic, and Ljubinka Muratovska-Markova were elected justices.

At yesterday's session, the representatives did not support three of the nineteen nominated Supreme Court justices. At his own request, one was dropped from the list of the Judicial Council of the Republic. The Assembly did not name the candidates who were not accepted, but according to unofficial explanations by a number of representatives, this applied to two judges who will be retiring next year and one candidate who had not been a judge in the past.

In the course of the debates that preceded the vote, Abdurahman Aliti (PDP [Party of Democratic Prosperity]) called for having more Albanians in the Supreme Court, stating that lawyers from that ethnic group could so far advance only to the level of township judges. Tomislav Stojanovski (DPM [Democratic Party of Macedonia]) disputed Aliti's arguments, pointing out that in Tetovo and Gostivar there are Albanian lawyers who hold higher positions compared to others, and he stressed the need to appoint judges for the Supreme Court based on quality criteria. Branko Arsovski (SPM [Socialist Party of Macedonia]) said that we must take competence and skill into consideration. Hisen Ramadani (independent) said that the participation of all citizens in judicial work

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leads to greater safety. Kenan Hasipi (DPT [Democratic Party of Turks]) mentioned the fact that some of the nominated candidates will soon have to retire, and noted that the various ethnics groups should be taken more into consideration.

Prior to the debate, Natje Stojanovski, chairman of the Elections and Appointments Commission, reacted by stating that the commission does not have an opinion on the motion of the Judicial Council of the Republic. Explaining that there are no problems in this case, Assembly chairman Stojan Andov nonetheless submitted Stojanovski's motion calling for the Assembly not to debate until the commission has issued its opinion. He put the matter to a vote but was not supported by even a single assemblyman.

[Box, p 3]

Biographies

Dimitrie Dimiskovski, chairman of the Supreme Court, was born on 30 August 1936 in Skopje. After graduating from law school in 1960 he was employed as public defender and expert counsel and, subsequently, by the Constitutional Court as expert assistant and secretary in charge of legal issues. In 1979 he was made a Supreme Court justice; from 1987 to 1994 he was a Constitutional Court justice. He has published ten works on the work of the Constitutional and Supreme courts.

Dr. Kiril Cavdar, Supreme Court justice, has been in the Supreme Court since 1992. Dimitar Uzunov, Pavel Manev, Konstantin Hadzi-Lega, Milojka Kalkaslieva, Vasil Petkovski, Milica Smickova, Ranko Maksimovski, and Petar Golubovski have been justices of the Supreme Court of Macedonia for several years. Agim Miftari was interim chairman of the Skopje Okrug Court. Zetjir Selimi was Kicevo Township judge. Ljubinka Muratovska-Markova works for the Supreme Court of the Republic of Macedonia. Dr. Fidanco Stoev was Constitutional Court judge, and Vangel Gagacev was Bitola Okrug Court judge.

Brucellosis Cases Reported in Prilep City

95BA0230B Skopje VECER in Macedonian 13 Apr 95 p 6

[Article by "A.T.": "Brucellosis Threatens"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prilep, 13 Apr—Twenty-three individuals suffering from brucellosis were identified and hospitalized in Prilep's City Hospital. A while back, seven or eight people from Belovodica village complained of the same disease; recently, their number reached twenty-three. The patients include three shepherds from Marnovo.

For the first time that disease appeared more extensively in Prilep six years ago, when the contagious diseases ward in the city hospital was filled, and one health inspector died. At that time the respective authorities took rigorous steps, in the course of which entire herds were destroyed. However, the disease has not been uprooted entirely. The Medical Center has gained some experience in rapid diagnosis and proper medical treatment of the patients. The problem is that the illness has sequels.

Managerial, Safety Problems at Skopje Airport

95BA0230A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 8 Apr 95 p 18

[Article by Blagoja Janev: "It Would Have Been Funny Had It Not Been So Tragic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Unexpected and dangerous situations that influence most directly the flight safety of passengers and freight occur repeatedly in Macedonian air traffic. Obsolete installations and burned-out lights make it necessary to close the airport in the evening. There is lack of discipline among pilots, airport officials, and other airline personnel, and nobody seems to care.

It looks as if Macedonian air communications cannot do without problems and disagreeable events that very clearly highlight all of shortcomings both organizationally and in every other way. After a brief calm of several months and a barely "normal" development of the work in that sphere (many are those who will say that in this case nothing has ever been the way it should be)—which is important to the economy—as well as in other spheres, there have been, of late, repeated consecutive unpleasant surprises. The information reaching the public specifically mentions a string of problems and events that may seem ordinary but, bearing in mind the tragic experience of one or two years ago—and the fact that in this area even the slightest defects, should they be ignored, lead to unexpected and repeated consequences—should worry, and even frighten, anyone involved in any way in our air communications. Of course this applies above all to the officials who are responsible for the normal and safe development of passenger air transportation, and for airline communications. It is not for no reason that this area is very tightly regulated throughout the world, and has extremely strict standards and rules.

Alarm Signal

What is it that keeps being a cause for alarm in the case of airline communications? Here the situation seems to have become increasingly complicated over a number of years—precisely when it was being claimed on all sides

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that tremendous efforts were being made to correct it. Obviously, it has not been corrected to this day.

We know that this week the public was informed about a seemingly ordinary event: For almost six days the Skopje airport was closed to traffic in the evening hours because of burned-out systems and lights. Aircraft that landed at 6:00 p.m., or that were scheduled to take off for various destinations in Europe, had to use the alternate airport in Ohrid. Let us say nothing of the difficulties this created for passengers, the airlines, and the airport enterprise, resulting in additional (substantial) expenditures. As our people would say: It would have been funny had it not been tragic.

What is the reason for the "short circuit" and the breakdown of the light signaling system at Skopje's airport? According to Zoran Krstevski, director of the Makedonija Airport Services Public Enterprise, and Goran Pavlovski, assistant to the minister of communications and transportation and head of the sector (directorate) for civil air navigation, it involves two factors. On the one hand, there is the age of the installation and the entire system at the country's main airport, installed in the 1950s. Meanwhile, while the rest of the world has long stopped using such systems, and looking for such lights takes time, out of a system that requires 120 special light bulbs that last one year, about 650 light bulbs had to be replaced last year alone.

It is interesting to point out that the American military aircraft Galaxy requires replacing 100 light bulbs (considering it does not fly more than a few times a year).

On the other hand, the problem also lies in the need for a comprehensive reconstruction of the light signaling system, which is related to the rebuilding of the runways under which the cables for the lighting installations pass.

Since we mentioned the runways and the turning areas in the airfield: Recently, in maneuvering and turning an airplane, a piece of the asphalt lining was virtually torn off. It is true that it was repaired, but this is yet another indicator—and a strong indication—of the age of, and the need to rebuild, the airport's runways and auxiliary strip, says Pavlovski, head of the civil air communications sector—speaking of the future office created via the law passed recently in parliament.

We also learned that during the period prior to the declaration of Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] independence—when two, or no more than three, airplanes landed and took off—now, on an annual basis, the volume of air flights has reached the level it had attained some ten years ago; hence the urgent need to rebuild the runways. This was scheduled to be completed this year, but because of a failure to name a contractor and to organize the financial structure for this project, we would be happy if it could be completed next year.

Last year, the landing facilities were transferred to the jurisdiction of the former Ministry of Urban Planning, Construction, Communications, and Ecology. They are currently managed by the Ministry of Communications and Transportation, and not by the Makedonija Airfield Services Public Enterprise, which manages the airport and earns a substantial income from airport services. That is why Pavlovski, head of the nation's air transportation authorities, says it is not a question of money, for the necessary ten to twelve million marks will be found. We now know the name of the contractor taking care of the investment (according to the present law it will be the ministry), which will have to let the airport enterprise take care of this project.

Threatened Safety

Another issue is that of the airlines. Their work continues to suffer from a wide range of violations both financial and operational. Until recently the three companies—Paler-Makedonija, MAT, and Avioimpeks—owed the state and the airports about five million marks. Recently: They barely managed to meet the airports' demand that they pay about one-third of the sum they owed by the end of last year. Avioimpeks, which according to the airport enterprise is considered the most regular payor for airport services, was this time again the first to pay off its not-very-high debt, whereas the other two are still behind—yet such funds are extremely necessary for paying for investment activities and maintaining the runways and flight control systems, as well as the buildings and other airport facilities.

This is by far not everything that is happening in Macedonian air communications and in the functioning of the companies. The airlines in our country and the airport personnel and foreign air carriers in Macedonia have found it more advantageous to operate in violation of legal stipulations, ignoring and violating safety rules that define strictly the conditions for conducting this business. For that reason, in the past, the Civil Air Flight Sector has charged them with some thirty violations—most from the second half of last year and involving airlines, airports and their personnel.

For example, five charges apply to four members of the airport personnel who did not add the weight of the hand-carried luggage, thus most directly threatening air safety.

One charge has been filed against a Paler-Makedonija pilot (a fine of 16,200 denars, or two pay periods'

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wages) for flying without a passenger list. Paler has already been fined for failure to supply information on the monthly scheduling and organization of flights.

If our own companies violate the regulations, why not the foreign airlines? A Belarusian Airways pilot flew to Macedonia without permission and without the permission of Macedonian air navigation authorities (the penalty was 24,300 denars, or three pay periods). Similar or even worse was the case of the Adria Airways Company, which on two separate occasions flew cargo between Ljubljana and Skopje without permission and landed without the approval of flight controllers, for which it was penalized as much as 20 pay periods.

For such violations, the civil air navigation sector charges low fines—the increase of which it has been demanding for quite some time, for they apply equally to passenger aircraft. According to Pavlovski, this creates a climate of slackness affecting virtually all participants in air communications, for which reason the directorate into which the current sector will be transformed, and the respective ministry, will naturally have to work more extensively, systematically, and comprehensibly. Tragic experience cautions us that such chaotic events in air transportation may turn out to be fatal.

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Second Round of EU Membership Talks Begins

AU1305135895 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 12 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The second unofficial round of talks between the delegations of Slovenia and the European Commission about the signing of an agreement on our country's associate membership in the EU started in Brussels today. The Slovene negotiating team consists of 10 representatives from various departments and is led by Benjamin Lukman, director of the Bureau for European Affairs of the Foreign Ministry.

The hitherto negotiations have shown that there are still differences in the negotiating position, which, however, are not unbridgeable. The greatest number of controversial issues is primarily in the realm of transport, financial services, and the right to form companies. Regarding transport, our country would like to secure, among other things, additional financing for the transport infrastructure.

The official talks with the representatives of the EU members and the European Commission will take place on Monday and Tuesday [15 and 16 May] and are supposed to enter into their final phase.

As for possible unresolved issues, a political decision will be needed in connection with them.

EC Demands Greater Opening to Foreign Capital

AU1305135995 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 12 May 95

[Report by Edo Zitnik from Brussels—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the realm of financial services, the Slovene negotiators today tried to secure as long as possible a transitional period during which the Slovene banks and insurance companies would be relatively shielded from foreign competition. According to one of our negotiators, the transition period, which would not be longer than six years, would even be beneficial for our financial institutions as they would, in this way, be forced into adjustment that would normally take longer.

Regarding transport, Slovenia is trying to safeguard a source of funds for the further development of the transport infrastructure. Since Slovenia is receiving some EU funds from the financial protocol of the present cooperation agreement, our negotiators are trying to secure a similar source of funds also in the associate membership agreement. This option formally does not exist and that is why the talks about a possible signing of a parallel agreement are under way. An agreement on a joint declaration on Koper harbor was reached in the transport part of the talks. With it, Slovenia received at least a principled EU consensus that it will help resolve the problems of the harbor when this faces direct competition from the nearby ports.

As it is known, Trieste was given a green light by the European Commission to form an investment center for Eastern and Central Europe that will definitely attract numerous investors due to tax relief.

As could be expected, in the realm of the capital flow, Slovenia was deemed relatively developed by the European Commission. At the same time, Slovenia has only about 1 percent of foreign capital, which is too little in comparison with normal market economies, where this share ranges between 15 and 25 percent. For this reason, the European Commission negotiators will demand a greater opening of Slovenia to foreign capital.

Since today's was only the so-called technical part of the negotiations, which will also continue tomorrow, neither the Slovene nor the EU negotiators wished to forecast the results before Tuesday [16 May], when the official part of the talks will be concluded. However, the European Commission seems to be satisfied with the progress of the negotiations, namely, its representative announced today that the commission, too, expects the conclusion of the talks within the envisaged deadlines, which means that the agreement could be signed on 12 June.

SDSS Wants Greater 'Defense Capacity'

AU1305140295 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 11 May 95 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Vodusek: "Social Democrats Warning About Declining Defense Capacity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 10 May—The Social Democrats [SDSS] conclude that the Slovene defense capacity has not been strengthening lately and warn that a lot of money from the law on basic development programs goes for the purchase of noncombat means—helicopters, which the Slovene Army does need, but not urgently.

The Slovene defense, especially antiarmor and antiaircraft, has not strengthened lately, which is an extreme negation of the experiences gained in the last war, when minimal means facilitated a successful defense of the country, Janez Jansa said at the news conference today.

As he said, Croatia has every right to integrate the occupied territories in its territory. A relatively powerful military force is emerging southeast of Slovenia and the state is not aware of it. The events in the vicinity allow for a possibility of a conflict between Serbia and Croatia, which shows the impotence of the international powers

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and the lack of understanding by the Slovene authorities, the Social Democratic president believes.

The remainder of the means from the basic development programs should be spent on purchase of the urgently needed arms rather than wasting money to finance certain companies at which the current defense minister used to be a helicopter salesman. According to the SDSS president, the Defense Ministry has turned into an outpost of Iskra Commerce.

The Social Democrats have distanced themselves from the state celebrations marking the anniversary of the end of World War II, because of the prevailing one-sided approach to the celebration at the state level. Janez Jansa does not know a state that would spend so much money on celebrations that divide the citizens. The party is surprised that the State Chamber speaker ignored all the initiatives for more balanced celebrations. The Social Democrats also warn about the background of the campaign against the changes to the law on money laundering.

National Democrats Merge With Social Democrats

AU1105195895 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 8 May 95 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Vodusek: "National Democrats Now in SDSS"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ljubljana, 7 May—At their congress Saturday [6 May] the National Democrats decided to merge with the Social Democratic Party [SDSS], where they will be active within the national forum. Thirty-six delegates voted in favor of unification; seven were against. The champions of independent party policy were, thus, clearly in the minority. There were no guests from other parties at the National Democrats' congress, not even from the SDSS. [passage omitted]

Krsko Nuclear Plant Built Near Tectonic Faults

AU1205180795

[FBIS Editorial Report] Ljubljana MAG in Slovene in its 20 April edition on pages 30 and 31 carries a report by Joze Biscak, examining the tectonic safety of the Krsko nuclear power plant.

According to Biscak, the nuclear power plant should officially withstand at least an eight degree earthquake on the Mercalli scale. However, the author quotes Uros Premru from the Geological Institute, who headed the investigation into the location designated for the power plant in the seventies, who claims that the director of the Slovene Power Industry at that time ordered that "all tectonic faults be erased from the geological and any other expert maps of Krsko Polje. This happened after the U.S. experts had dismissed the possibility of the plant being built within a 8-km circle from the active seismological faults. So they were removed and the local residents could have read in a placating leaflet they received in 1973 that there was no tectonic fault in the direct vicinity and that the construction was safe."

As Biscak points out, the choice of the site was "a political decision, which the experts (were instructed to) merely confirm."

Biscak maintains that "three faults run into the 8-km circle around the reactor of the nuclear power plant. They were discovered by Austrian geologist A. Tornquist after the earthquake on 19 January 1917 in the vicinity of Brezice, which had a magnitude of 5.6 degrees on the Mercalli scale according to the Ljubljana observatory and 5.7 degrees on the Mercalli scale according to the Zagreb observatory. Three faults became active during the Brezice earthquake—the Prilipe, Malence, and Brezice faults—all of which Tornquist described as 'evidently young, alive, and active.'

'However," Biscak explains further, "the power plant is not situated on top of active superficial faults that could pose a danger in themselves, without an earthquake. This has been ascertained beyond any doubt, and they do not represent a source of earthquakes. These sources are deep down, in the active tectonic faults, where, during earthquakes, energy is released that causes movement on the surface and seismic waves spreading from the source toward the surface. The security of the nuclear power plant is, in this case, affected by the waves that cause the movement of the ground, which we express by the momentum factor. A safe power plant must be designed so that the building and various parts of the power plant can withstand the movement of the ground without any damage even in the most powerful of earthquakes."

According to Biscak, the experts deemed a momentum of up to 0.3 grams [measurement as published] safe for the power plant. However, in connection with this, Biscak recalls the 28 December 1989 earthquake with a magnitude of 3.2 degrees on the Richter scale, whose momentum of the surface of the ground was approximately 0.5 grams and which resulted in the "high frequency and brief movement of the ground" that caused "a real panic" in the plant. Biscak concludes that, in the absence of proper monitoring of the seismic activity in the region, one cannot give a final answer whether "the Krsko nuclear power plant is safe or not."

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Article: Negotiators Challenge Italy's Claims

95BA0235A Ljubljana MLADINA in Slovene
11 Apr 95 pp 24-25

[Article by Igor Mekina: "Italian Debt"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *At the end of last week, when the Slovene Foreign Ministry's special envoy for relations with Italy, Matjaz Jancar, delivered to his Italian counterparts in Rome a comprehensive stack of documents dealing with the forcible confiscation of property and the damages that the Italian state caused the Slovene minority on its territory in the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's, his Italian interlocutors were literally shocked.*

When they collected themselves to some extent after their first surprise, they reportedly retorted to the Slovene negotiators that such a discussion was not even possible because it would be the same thing "as if the Sudeten Germans today wanted back all the property that they left outside Germany's borders." "You are right. But we have been pointing out precisely that for three years now. That is why we also have to adhere to valid agreements," the smiling Slovene negotiators answered them.

Mirror Effect

Of course, one cannot avoid the impression that Slovene foreign policy's step came three years too late. The latest propaganda and diplomatic offensive by Slovene diplomacy is of course coming at a time when there will once again be a big deadlock in negotiations with Italy and when an exacerbation of relations actually cannot hurt much. Regardless of the final results of this diplomatic action, one naturally cannot overlook the fact that after three years of promises by Dimitrije Rupel, Lojze Peterle, and many others, Slovenia will nevertheless partly have to give in to Italy. If that is the case, however, Thaler's initiative, by raising new issues on the basis of reciprocity, can only help Slovenia during the blockade. On one hand, if something has to be given up, it is of course equally wise to look over our cards again first and determine whether we can also get something in exchange.

The logic of the latest Slovene tactic with respect to Italy is therefore actually extremely simple. It is based on the assumption that the past is regulated by international treaties that should be respected, and that all the issues still disputed can be settled outside the mutual obligations already assumed, in accordance with the principles of good-neighborliness, humanity, and reciprocity. What does that mean in practice? Very simply, just that if Italy continues its policy of revising international treaties, Slovenia will show Italy its mirror image. Even though they confirmed the treaties once again in 1992, the Italian negotiators are still not satisfied with the Rome agreement of 1983 and are even demanding restoration of the real estate that Slovenia took over through the peace treaty of 1947. They are not bothered by the amount, but rather the form of payment. Today they no longer want money, which they wanted several years ago, but instead want the return of all the real estate, in kind. While Lojze Peterle was minister, Slovene diplomacy disgracefully retreated before those demands and/or opposed them with Slovene demands that were incompatible with them: regulation of minority protection for the Slovene minority in Italy, Italian support in the EU, and so forth. Now that policy is finished; Slovenia is to oppose the Italian demands with equivalent ones. The position of one minority is thus to be compared to the position of the other and regulated in accordance with it, and the issue of returning property on one side of the border with the issue of returning property on the other side.

Is Italy, then, still insisting on the return of formerly confiscated Italian property in kind? All right, Slovene diplomats answer, but what about the Slovene property that was seized by the Italian authorities during the period of fascism through discriminatory measures and decrees, and that is still occupied today by the Italian tax service, Army, and other state institutions? Perhaps today Italy is no longer satisfied with the 1947 peace treaty? All right, but why would Slovenia be satisfied with it? Specifically, upon the occupation of Yugoslavia Italy caused approximately $1.6 billion in war damages, mostly to Slovenia. The necrophiliac comparison of corpses and destroyed buildings is an extremely disagreeable matter, and consequently it would be better, of course, if Italy did not raise these issues, at least in accordance with the rules of good taste. As far as Slovenia is concerned, however, the result of such statistics is undoubtedly very "favorable" to Slovenia. Specifically, during the war the Italian armed forces destroyed 19,230 buildings in Slovenia, along with farmland, crops, and livestock, and damaged another 12,261 buildings. To be sure, some of the material damage, in the amount of $1.6 billion, was repaid to Yugoslavia, but the 29,000 people deported to camps, 145 hostages, 13,186 people sentenced by military courts (83 to death), and 6,000 casualties and missing persons were never sufficiently "accounted for." In comparison with the damages to Italy, which can only "boast" of 619 Italians proven to have been killed during the 1 May to 12 June 1934 Yugoslav occupation of Trieste and the 1,504 Italians who died in pits, were liquidated, or died in camps at the end of the war, those figures are tremendously higher. In that case neither Slovenia nor Italy can demand reparations in kind for objective reasons, but Slovenia, of course, for the same reasons as Italy (altered international circum-

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stances), could demand a reassessment and reparations for the damages, which are almost incomparable with those of Italy.

In this regard, Slovene diplomacy has one more important advantage over Italian diplomacy. Italian diplomats today are demanding the return to Italian citizens of the confiscated real estate for which compensation was already specified by international treaties, but the issue of Italy's unsettled debt to Slovenia—according to the same standards—is much more urgent and unsettled. The property that was taken away from the Slovene minority in Italy by decrees and forcible liquidations, in fact, was never returned. Today not a single treaty on it has been concluded between Italy and Yugoslavia. The situation is thus truly paradoxical: Slovenia has already paid Italy for all the confiscated Italian property (or else partial compensation has been paid and specified by international treaties), but Italy has never paid Slovenia or the Slovene minority a penny for the cultural centers, bookstores, publishing houses, and other Slovene institutions burnt on its territory during the fascist period. In contrast to Yugoslavia, which by agreeing in 1983 to pay $110 million for the confiscated Italian property in Zone B formally acknowledged the illegitimate nature of the nationalizations and other forcible measures, to this very day Italy has not yet renounced the legitimacy of the fascist measures by which property was confiscated from members of the Slovene minority. Thus, actually at the moment when Italian state bodies are occupying the former Slovene real estate without any compensation whatsoever, Italian diplomacy is disdainfully quibbling over the treaties that have already been signed and confirmed, and setting additional conditions for Slovenia, which has already settled its obligations to the claimants.

Millions of Dollars in Damages

The list of the real estate confiscated on the territory of present-day Italy and the material damages that Italy inflicted on Slovenes and never repaid is a long one. Between the two wars, 300,000 Slovenes and about 180,000 Croats lived in the Giulia province. Because of the fascist authorities' measures, about 100,000 (approximately two-thirds of them Slovenes) of them emigrated. They mostly left for overseas or to the SHS [Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes] state. Before a special fascist court, 544 of them were sentenced, 36 to death, and all the defendants were sentenced to a total of 4,900 years of hard labor. Between the years 1923 and 1927, 488 predominantly Slovene elementary schools and 4,000 companies with libraries were closed in the Giulia province, 300 economic cooperatives and 137 people's savings banks were liquidated, and more than 20 other Slovene minority real estate properties were destroyed. In 1923, the Italianization of Slovene names and surnames and regional names also began. In the Trieste province alone, 50,000 people were forced to change their surnames. In March 1928, Law No. 388, which even prohibited giving children "Slavic" names, also came out. Although Italy later repealed that fascist decree, a law automatically restoring all the changed surnames to their original form has not been issued to this very day. All of these were measures because of which even Italian historians today acknowledge that Italy conducted "cultural genocide" against members of the Slovene minority and others.

The other side of the same story, of course, is the destruction of Slovene property and institutions, which began on 13 July 1920 with the burning of the People's Center in Trieste. A hotel, the headquarters of a bank, an auditorium, a restaurant, a mountaineering society, and the biggest Slovene library in Italy were destroyed. The People's Center was burnt by the fascists, who in their own way oversaw the arson the whole time. They shot at everyone who appeared in the windows, and cut the firefighters' hoses so that they could not put out the fire. Some people had no other choice but to jump out of the windows to get away from the flames. There were many guests in the hotel rooms at that time, including some from the United States. On the same day, fascist groups also attacked the Ljubljana Credit Bank, the Croatian Savings Bank, the General Savings Bank, the Adriatic Bank, the Edinost [Unity] Press, and a Serbian school. A week later the Workers' Center in Trieste was attacked, and on 2 November the People's Center at St. Ivan's. Later the military authorities also occupied the People's Center at Prosek and the theater at St. Jacob's in Trieste. The Edinost Press was attacked seven times just up until 1921, with serious damage done to the printing presses. Arson and destruction also followed in subsequent years. The People's Center at Holy Cross, the People's Center at Skedenj, Rojan, Barkovlje, and St. Magdalen's, and the DELO newspaper's press were completely destroyed. In Gorizia, the People's Center, the Catholic Press, the Commercial Center, and many farms, lawyers' offices, and other personal property of Slovenes were destroyed. A special measure taken by Mussolini also liquidated the Trieste Savings and Loan, which was taken over immediately after Italy's attack against Yugoslavia by Casa di risparmio, which thus acquired one-third more capital.

Restitution

The financial damage that occurred because of such actions by the Italian state was enormous, and it is difficult to estimate it. Still most credible is the estimate

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of material damage that was conducted immediately after the burning of the people's centers in the 1920's, which Slovene experts reappraised again in 1989. According to those estimates, which were conducted partly by certified appraisers, the material damage associated just with the centers destroyed in Trieste, calculated at the 1989 exchange rate, amounted to more than 57.650 billion lire, or, calculated at today's exchange rate, approximately 82 million German marks [DM]. If we also add to that the value of the people's centers destroyed in Gorizia, the burnt village of Cezarje, and several buildings in Dreznica, of course even without figuring in the damage caused by all the other discriminatory and genocidal Italian measures in the past, we can arrive at a figure that will probably not be less than the $110 million that Slovenia and Croatia together have to pay for the confiscated Italian property in Zone B of the former Trieste Free Territory, especially because Slovenia only owes Italy approximately 60 percent of that $110 million.

Italy thus owes Slovenia or the Slovene minority at least as much as Slovenia owes for the confiscated property of Italian citizens in Zone B. In contrast to the damages suffered by Italian citizens in Slovenia, however, the damages suffered by the Slovenes in Italy have so far never been the subject of international negotiations. Of course, for decades now Slovene minority organizations have been demanding "restitution," or the payment of compensation for all the property that was destroyed, and monetary compensation for all those who were wrongly convicted and sentenced to prison. The Italian state could pay the compensation primarily to the disbanded organizations or their successors. The Slovene Theater or Music Society, of course, have the same missions as their predecessors disbanded during the fascist period, and consequently Italy could treat them as "successor organizations" and pay compensation to them. There thus should not be any particular difficulties about private rights. For example, if the fascist squads destroyed the lawyer's office of Dr. Abram i Agneletto, or in honor of the elections and with great joy burnt the house of Andreja Sturman on 15 May 1921, Italy, as a modern European state, should not have any excessive difficulties today in looking for their grandchildren. The heirs of Matija Smotlak in Mackolije, whose house was likewise burnt along with four head of cattle, should also be included without any particular hesitation in an intergovernmental treaty on righting wrongs; only with respect to the destroyed office and apartment of the Kingdom of the SHS delegate, to whom the Italian fascists did what was then 900,000 lire in damage, would there probably be some difficulties today in finding the one to whom compensation should be paid....

The issue of whether present-day Italy is responsible for the savagery of the fascist hordes is completely academic, of course. In view of the fact that all of the most important Italian international lawyers also maintain that modern Italy is the legal successor of the former state, it is of course its duty to right the historical wrongs done by its fascist predecessor. Italy, which is demanding "good will" measures from Slovenia, should therefore first of all revoke Mussolini's decree shutting down the Trieste Savings and Loan, and then reimburse the damages to all the others as well. If Slovenia recognizes itself as a successor to Yugoslavia, recognizes the latter's treaties, and is prepared to right the wrongs done, Italy should also do the same thing and without hesitation display readiness to right the wrongs done by fascism. That is required not only by the principle of fairness, but also by the principle of reciprocity. Specifically, in politics, just as in ethics, the fairness of a practical policy can best be judged when it is judged from the standpoint of the rule of universalization: "Act and request that others act in accordance with a maxim that you want to become a universal law." As far as Slovene-Italian relations are concerned, that rule could be phrased as follows: "If you think that the wrongs that happened to your minority in the past should be corrected, then also correct the wrongs that you yourself did to other minorities in the past." The Italian diplomats' surprise at the Slovene demands is proof, of course, that the validity of that ethical stance still has fairly limited scope in international politics.

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Federal

Lilic: Support for Peaceful Policy Expected

AU1305203795 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 13 May 95

[Report by Dragana Kuzmanovic-Janicic—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Opening the 62d International Agricultural Fair in Novi Sad, Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic said that, according to the number of business contracts signed, the Novi Sad Fair is the largest presentation of the Yugoslav economy, particularly agriculture and the accompanying industrial branches. This fair is certainly the meeting point of businessmen from our country and the world, as well as a great display of the greatest and most ambitious production programs. As President Lilic said, one can hardly find another country in the world with such an abundance of natural conditions. Agriculture and its modernization represent a powerful factor of Yugoslavia's development. One should certainly point out that some very valuable results have been reached in agriculture. Everything that has been achieved—even though it was with support from the state—was achieved above all through the great work and self-denial of the farmers themselves, President Lilic pointed out.

Our producers have a lot to show, both to us and to the guests from abroad, and it remains our obligation to enable them to produce even more and better. This is in their own interest, as well as of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, President Lilic said and went on to say the following:

[Lilic] With such a principled and in our opinion, the only effective policy, the FRY has become a factor of stability in the Balkans and a reliable and definite partner in the peace process. Particularly today, at the opening of this significant exhibition, I would like to point out that we are going to do everything we can to create for you even better conditions to produce even more.

This is why it must be one of our tasks to have the FRY continue to consistently and actively advocate stability, peace, and cooperation with all countries and peoples. We are seeing the future of our country and our citizens in good-neighborly and stable relations in the Balkans, in a Europe of peace and cooperation, and the international community of equal states and equal peoples.

We are resolute to contributing to democratic movements in Europe and the world with our peace-loving policy. We must endure together on that road. We have many times pointed out that peace and stability are our strategic orientations. Therefore, we justifiably expect the policy of pressure and blackmail not to be used for the country that has been recognized as a factor of peace. We expect support and confidence to be extended to us not only in words but in deeds as well. It is clear even to those people who do not want to admit it, that the policy of pressure, sanctions, ultimatums, and punishment has shown itself to be not only inefficient and inhumane, but also counterproductive. Sanctions have become the strongest creator of instability and a threat to peace. Their extension realistically threatens to bring about an even more difficult and dangerous destabilization because the sanctions above all support the advocates of war.

The latest events in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republic of Croatia have confirmed this. The Muslim side has refused to extend the cease-fire and the Croatian Army has perpetrated a brutal attack on the Serbian civilians in the Republic of Serb Krajina. It has been shown once again that the advocates of war have betrayed that part of the international community who want the war conflicts in the former Yugoslavia to stop and thereby the danger for [words indistinct] region be removed.

We were convinced that the [word indistinct] World War II obligates all countries to build [words indistinct] to be the man's pride. Today, 50 years since the defeat of fascism, we realize that it would be a fateful mistake to allow some acts of today to turn the world to the dark past again. Our trust in the future will not be betrayed if the most responsible countries of the world work on leaving behind all arrogance, blackmail, and the use of force.

[Kuzmanovic-Janicic] President Lilic then visited the most significant producers of Yugoslavia. [passage omitted]

Interior Minister Views Security Achievements

LD1205185795 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1702 GMT 12 May 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 12 May (TANJUG)—Serbian Interior Minister Zoran Sokolovic said in an interview for BORBA—to be carried by this daily tomorrow, on the occasion of Security Day on 13 May—that the security situation in the Republic of Serbia this and last year improved compared to the previous years.

Speaking about the results achieved by employees of the ministry in this period, Sokolovic drew attention to the thwarted attempt of the armed organizing of Albanian separatists in Kosovo and Metohija, as well as to

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preventing other extremists from destabilizing the security situation in the republic and provoking intranational clashes, terrorism, and separatism. [passage omitted]

He warned of ever-present attempts to threaten the territorial integrity of the republic of Serbia.

"However, we are right to be optimistic, because we have successfully prevented all organized attempts at destabilizing the situation. Our biggest success, achieved together with other state bodies, has been in preventing the war approaching our borders and spreading to the territory of Serbia, i.e. the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," Sokolovic said.

He warned that the civil war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina and the latest tragic events in the [Bosnian] Serb republic were directly linked with the security situation in our country, and added:

"There is a real risk that the clashes in our neighborhood may spread if armed conflicts are not stopped. We welcome and support the efforts of the international community in this direction and hope that they continue so that peace can finally be established in the interest of all."

He recalled that Belgrade is making enormous efforts in the direction of a peaceful settlement of the crisis, through political and not military means. [passage omitted]

Sokolovic said that over the past period the Ministry of Internal Affairs has achieved remarkable results in preventing Kosovo and Metohija from becoming a crisis area which could destabilize the situation in Serbia.

"We are constantly severing numerous channels for illegal traffic of arms and weapons, explosive devices and other military equipment. Albanian separatists' aims and concrete plans to set up illegal paramilitary units have been promptly revealed and thwarted," he said.

Sokolovic said that measures in the southern province are implemented "only in cases of people who have committed the most serious criminal acts. Therefore, constant accusations of alleged 'mass repression' of Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija are groundless."

He added that six members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were killed and 50 suffered slight and serious injuries in attacks by Albanian terrorists carried out over the last three years and the first three months of this year.

Sokolovic said that certain groups of Albanian extremists are still working on the realization of separatist goals and that they have "the support of circles in their home state and certain circles abroad."

"However, we can guarantee that such unrealistic ambitions are doomed and that the Ministry of Internal Affairs has enough forces and resources to prevent them," he said. [passage omitted]

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